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# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
## East Europe

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## Socialist Party Leader Reviews Congress

*AU1306100494 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 7 Jun 94 p 5*

[Interview with Zhan Videnov, chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party Supreme Council, by Dora Chichkova in Sofia on 6 June: "If You Fight Battles of the Past You Remain in the Past"]

[Text] Zhan Videnov gave DUMA this interview after a long and sleepless night on the fourth day of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] congress. Very tired, with bloodshot eyes—which, according to people close to him, he has had for months—he changed all known notions of ability to work and physical and moral stamina. He was chased by a mob of journalists, who no longer attach a different family name to his name, and remained calm, confident, and generous, as the undisputable leader of the greatest and staunchest Bulgarian party.

[Chichkova] Did you anticipate such an unconditional victory as party leader?

[Videnov] It is difficult for me to assess this. I can only say that I did not have any problems with the congress' tactic, because it fully springs from the strategy I have followed over the last two and a half years. This is a rather simpler, but very efficient strategy—it relies on consistency, dignity, openness, and selflessness. Others relied on different schemes, and I think that they made a mistake, because as we all constantly say, the BSP is a changing party. None of its congresses repeats the previous one. Whoever wants to fight the battles of the past should remain in the past.

[Chichkova] I had the feeling that this was a struggle not only for the formal, but also for the informal BSP leadership. Does the congress put an end to the inner-party theme of the dual character of the power, and the theme about the existence of two or even more centers of power in the party?

[Videnov] I think that the existence of different sources of political impulse within the BSP is not only a trouble but a source of wealth for the BSP. We got used to working under such conditions and utilizing its advantages. We almost completely eliminated its obvious risks. Therefore, I do not view the problems regarding the BSP leadership as an action aimed at annihilating certain weapon emplacements of the enemy. On the contrary, I strive to connect all those manifestations of talent and initiative, responsibility and human dignity, into a common net. There are thousands of such manifestations, they form the BSP power, and there is no reason to separate them.

[Chichkova] Are you concerned with the future relations with the BSP Sofia city organization? I mean the recent tension that was evoked and the results of the congress.

[Videnov] I do not see reason for a lasting conflict. The BSP Sofia city organization was represented very strongly at the congress. I had the opportunity both to understand the congress' thinking and contribute to its forming. I think that in this process the Sofia delegates became convinced that they must correct some of their postulates. For example, the issue regarding the leaders' morals as a BSP problem. This could be the basic problem of another party, or a certain former party, but not of the BSP! No, this really is not a BSP problem.

I do not think that the party has the right to utilize its basic problems in an attempt to resolve tactical tasks. I mean ideological problems, management problems, and problems related to the party's dignity. Those problems must remain outside the realm of tactics. Tactical goals should be pursued by tactical means. The congress created the opportunity to utilize such means. I rejoice not at the fact that they failed, but at the fact that with certain minor exceptions, such means were not used at all. This shows that the party clearly distinguishes between its strategy and tactics, and is not inclined to use every acutely topical issue as a combat weapon.

[Chichkova] At the beginning of your first mandate you said something like "there is no Zhan Videnov political line." What could you say at the beginning of your second mandate?

[Videnov] If I remember correctly, I said that Zhan Videnov's political image is not clear to the party, and that if the party selected him, it must be aware of the risk it is taking. I do not know whether the party accepted this risk with open or closed eyes. I think that they were half opened.

Now, I again would warn the party of the same thing, as far as the leaders' issue is concerned. I did everything that depends on me to help the party form, clarify, and stress its ideological image. I did this also through my participation in the congress. I think that now the party has a better opportunity to calculate the risk it took. The new risk the party will have with its reelected leader is that ... I go a bit too far in seeking unity of ideas, words, and deeds. I demand this not only from myself, but also from all the rest, and the party as a whole. There are complex and deeply rooted inert processes in our party, and they change very slowly. In any event, I did not offend anyone. As far as the half-opened eyes are concerned, they could open completely at the next congress.

[Chichkova] Do the decisions of the 41st BSP Congress regarding the BSP political line preclude future dramatic splits such as the one that emerged at the last vote of confidence in the cabinet?

[Videnov] The congress confirmed the correctness of the political line implemented after the 1990 40th BSP Congress, despite all the complex vicissitudes in the political situation since then. I think that the congress' work was facilitated to a large degree by the last plenum of the BSP Supreme Council. It produced a good analysis, clear assessment, and precise explanation of the need for change. The congress understood the reasons why we maintained the line of stabilization throughout all those difficult months, and the reasons that prompted

the change in this line. We decided to seek a solution through early elections this fall.

[Chichkova] Are the specific steps the BSP intends to adopt to win those elections clear?

[Videnov] We have two basic tasks. The first is to complete what we planned, paid for, and practically accomplished in the activity of the parliament and our relations with the cabinet. The second is to guarantee that free, honest, and democratic elections be held in Bulgaria in a stable situation, and that those elections will produce a mandate for a lasting and successful leftist-centrist government.

The first task is very difficult, but it could be implemented. I do not have the illusion, as some of the congress delegates, that from now on every parliamentary week will be similar to the last one. No, they will be completely different, and it will constantly be more difficult.

The second task is even more difficult, not because of the danger of an authoritarian degeneration of the transition or radical changes in the political situation and the positions of the other political forces. (I do not think that those possibilities are very plausible, but I do not underestimate or exclude them.) The difficult part is to overcome the thinking that we can assert ourselves through the negation of others. We must rely on the principle according to which we could and must negotiate with everyone.

Moreover, after two and a half years it is high time to soberly assess the possibilities of a practical leftist-centrist agreement. Unfortunately, such an agreement does not depend only on us. I assess the situation in the Bulgarian leftist and leftist-centrist forces as very bad. However, with a bit more commitment, consistency, insistence, and concentration of the BSP efforts, the situation there could probably change.

[Chichkova] Do you like the new BSP Supreme Council?

[Videnov] Yes, I definitely like the new BSP Supreme Council. I think that it can accomplish a lot. I rejoice equally at its new members and at the fact that the continuity in its membership represents the confidence in what my closest associates in the party and parliamentary leadership have accomplished in the last two and a half years.

## Commentator Assesses Results of BSP Congress

*AU1006133094 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Jun 94 p 6*

[Commentary by Khristo Bardaliev: "Bulgarian Socialist Party Made Painful Step Toward Power"]

[Text] It is no exaggeration to say that the 41st BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Congress was awaited with interest not only by society but also by the various parties and coalitions. The BSP supporters had good reason to expect (and demand) a clear stance on the current political and economic crisis. The main opponent of the BSP, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], convened a special session of the National Coordinating Council to enable it to react immediately to the congress decisions. The other parliamentary and extraparliamentary parties impatiently waited for the congress to end, mostly so that they could reorient themselves regarding the date of possible early elections and the potential chance of utilizing the "red" carrier rocket for new parliamentary seats.

Naturally, it is as yet too early to speak of any full and precise answer to these issues. Nevertheless, the main tendencies in the development of the BSP can be divined.

The most important thing—for both the BSP and the whole of Bulgarian society—was that the congress prevented restorational and nostalgic longings for the "bright past" to gain the upper hand in its decisions on the BSP program and statute. The rejection of the draft documents submitted by the "Marxist Alternative" faction is proof enough of this.

The convincing majority by which Zhan Videnov was reelected as leader indicates that his views will form the basis of the parties practical politics in the future. Incidentally, the conservatives did gain their revenge by preventing a number of prominent members of the OSD [Alliance for Social Democracy] from being elected to the Supreme Council—people like Dimitur Yonchev, Velislava Dureva, Rosen Karadimov, and Elena Poptodorova. In this way the provincial delegates showed that they do not like free thinkers, or perhaps they merely think that they can thus make room for new deputies in the next parliament.

Andrey Lukanov's star also faded. Evidently, the accusations heaped upon him of banking swindles had their effect, or perhaps he had simply become an embarrassment, being too closely connected with the former leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, or again, maybe both factors played a part.

Surprisingly, Aleksandur Marinov also met with failure. It is difficult to say what he paid the price for—his excessive personal ambitions or his too close connections with Aleksandur Lilov.

These personnel changes indicate something of real importance, namely that the BSP is taking difficult and painful steps along the road of replacing its dogmatic ideology with pragmatism. They also show that it already realizes the need to break out of the magic circle of insider quarrels about the kind of "social democracy" or "democratic socialism" that mean nothing in themselves, and is moving toward a specific program and concrete actions arising therefrom.

The party's specific program and actions will be determined by the internal balance within the BSP, between the party elite, linked with young Bulgarian business,

and the mood of the party mass membership, which is dominated by the feelings of the sections of Bulgarian society with fewest rights—the pensioners, peasants, and unemployed.

The BSP can no longer rely on cheap populist ploys, especially since it has attracted much opprobrium by its support of the Berov cabinet, support provided in the name of economic and social stabilization—hopes that proved illusory.

The renunciation of direct ideologizing is even more necessary if the party wants to find allies for the upcoming election duel. The less said about concepts and the more about the nation's problems, the easier the BSP will find it to attract more of the better-quality parties and personalities. This will provide the best answer to the meaningless question: "Is the BSP changing?"

"He who does not advance loses ground"—the BSP headquarters at 20 Pozitano Street has enough historians and philosophers who are well aware of the truth of this Latin saying. The question is whether the new leadership will succeed to turn "the word into flesh," as the Gospel puts it.

## CSSD Deputy To Chair BIS Commission

*AU1006142194 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Jun 94 p 3*

[Article by "(has)": "An Opposition Deputy Has Become Head of the Parliamentary Commission for the Security and Information Service"]

[Text] Prague—The reason Tomas Svoboda (Christian Democratic Party), chairman of the parliamentary commission for supervising the Security and Information Service (BIS), has resigned is apparently that he does not have enough time to execute his post. Svoboda has told LIDOVE NOVINY that "nothing more serious happened" and that he will carry on as deputy chairman of the commission. In connection with the anticipated discussion on the recall of T. Fejfar (Civic Democratic Party), deputy chairman of the Defense and Security Committee, Svoboda categorically rejected the possibility that he could take up this post. He described as speculation the CTK report that he aspires to the post of committee deputy chairman. The new chairman of the commission is current Deputy Chairman V. Doubrava (Czech Social Democratic Party) [CSSD]. In reply to a question on what he thinks of the fact that an opposition deputy chairs the commission for supervising the secret service, Svoboda said that "Doubrava is very objective."

## Rights of Parliamentary Control Body Outlined

*AU1006143894 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 7 Jun 94 p 6*

[Commentary by Marian Schmarcz: "Control Means Credibility for Secret Services"]

[Text] Despite the fact that intelligence services belong to executive bodies, it is impossible to apply the same open system of parliamentary control to them as to other central bodies. Intelligence services work with secrets on the preservation of which the security of the state depends. On the other hand, secret services pose a potential danger to human rights. The system of control over them has to take these two peculiarities into account.

In our country, this mechanism has been worked out for only the Security and Information Service [BIS]. The intelligence service and the Army's intelligence departments are working safely hidden under the shell of the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry, where they are based. According to BIS director Devaty, however, it is very unreasonable to reject parliamentary control. Parliamentary control most efficiently disperses suspicion that, under the lid of the intelligence pot, a dark soup of intrigues and political conspiracy is boiling.

It is usual in the world that primary control over the work of secret services is performed by the government, who also uses secret services' information to make decisions. Audit is a strong tool in this respect. The very fact that funds are being allocated to them on the basis of specific assignments keeps a tight hand on the intelligence service members. It is difficult to imagine that agents would finance possible subversive actions from their own funds.

Intelligence activity, however, closely touches upon the human rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In the BIS case, the applicable law allows imposing limitations on them. Independent judges (as regards utilization of intelligence gathering technology, for instance), as well as a special parliamentary body, keep an eye on the respect for this law. This arrangement is usual in a number of European countries; it is not a rule, however. In the Netherlands, for example, this supervision is performed by a commission of selected ministers.

Our experience with the former State Security has led us to establish permanent and preventive parliamentary supervision over BIS, unlike in Great Britain, for instance, where the appropriate institutions inspect secret services only on the basis of a specific complaint. In France, there is no control over counterintelligence, which is part of the police.

Our deputies have at their disposal all of BIS's internal regulations (on record-keeping, internal control, etc.), and, thanks to that fact, they know how to proceed. From the accounting documents they receive, they can get a rough picture of BIS activities in individual spheres. They conduct their audits directly at workplaces of the secret service, and they can demand any data from the archive without any limitation. The principle of hierarchic limitation on access to information does not apply to them. Anyone at BIS who wants to see his colleague's folder must give a specific reason for that. The Czech secret service introduced these barriers after its bad experience with the former Federal Security and Information Service. It was precisely its benevolent internal regulations that made it easy for Wallis to dig into secret files.

Actions that are in progress, however, are the prohibited zone, where the secret service refuses to admit the deputies. The results of the secret service are always directly proportional to the extent to which the leak of information can be prevented. The service employees themselves do not know agents other than those to whom they directly give assignments. The law on BIS requires that the security of these people be protected, and data on them must not be divulged, not even to deputies.

Devaty concluded a gentleman's agreement with deputies that, at their request, he would close any file to allow them to inspect it. At the same time, he requires from the deputies that they assume their burden of responsibility for the possible consequences this could have on the security of the state or the lives of BIS members, who could be endangered by the deputies' indiscretion. Nothing like that has happened, however; on the other hand, no case of a well-founded complaint about the violation of human rights has been recorded.

A secret service worthy of that name will certainly never admit anyone from outside into its most intimate places, which are the files of the agents and cases in progress. If some law forced them to make these documents accessible, the intelligence staffers would rather keep their knowledge in their heads or somewhere else, leaving empty folders for the controllers. On the other hand, it is in the interest of all of the secret services to be as open as possible to parliamentary control (by opposition deputies, above all), if it is possible from the viewpoint of their operation. However, absolutely nontransparent military and police intelligence departments are hiding in the shadow of BIS, which is controlled by parliament and which operates according to law. This is not to the benefit of the credibility of special services as a whole.

## HZDS Win Seen as 'Obstacle' to Integration

*AU1006153094 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 8 Jun 94 p 2*

[From the "News" column]

[Text] Christian Democratic Movement Chairman Jan Carnogursky yesterday held talks with Karl Lamers, CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] foreign policy spokesman in the German Bundestag, on Slovakia's domestic and foreign political situation. Lamers said, among other things, that a possible victory of Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia in the coming elections would be an obstacle to Slovakia's integration into Europe.

## Meciar Addresses HZDS Rally in Bratislava

*AU1006161994 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 4 Jun 94 p 4*

[Article by Eva Zelenayova]

[Excerpts] The first Wednesday of each month only seemingly belongs to the residents of Bratislava. No one with even the slightest chance of getting into Bratislava to attend the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] rally misses an opportunity to hear Vladimir Meciar and his coworkers speak. This week, too, the banners in the "Na Pasienkoch" indoor stadium revealed that people from Prievidza, Topolcany, Nove Zamky, and Komarno, as well as Slovaks from the United States, were present. [passage omitted]

As usual, HZDS Chairman Vladimir Meciar was the first to take the floor: [passage omitted] "Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, allow me to thank all of you who have come here this evening to meet HZDS members and leading officials and their present and future coalition partners. (applause, followed by the reminder that today is the Day of the Child) Our rallies will soon require a bigger stadium. (....) The rallies attract considerable attention; no lesser person than the president himself is their commentator. (applause) Whenever we meet, it creates ripples, and there is something to write about. (....) Over the past two weeks, I crisscrossed Slovakia from east to west, and everywhere I came across uncertainty, irritation, unrest, and a longing for action. It is becoming apparent that it was a big mistake to postpone the elections until September. They should have been over by the end of June because parliament and society (unceasing applause) are getting into a deep depression and parliament into a profound moral and political crisis. Of course, the developments of the past few weeks raise questions and call for answers. First of all, I would like to pause to consider some activities of the government that distress us. There is nothing to praise, nor will there be anything to praise. But there are plenty of things to rail against and many reasons to swear. First of all, the political background of the government had been shrouded in fog and concealed. Everyone was telling us that we were lying when we spoke about the existence of an eight-point agreement between the government and the Hungarian political parties. (noise in the hall) Although we can deduce from reports what these eight points are, we emphatically ask the government to publish the secret agreements so that we can learn whose vassal it is and whom it wants to serve. (applause) We want to know why the government accepted and pledged to implement the program of the Komarno appeal of January 1994 [containing demands of the ethnic Hungarian minority], which has been condemned by the majority of the citizens of Slovakia. Whose government is this? Who does it represent?"

### Balladur Plan Is Superfluous

Vladimir Meciar then devoted himself to the itinerant activities of the Moravcik government and said, among other things, that he considers the Balladur plan superfluous in view of existing agreements. "We want the same rules for all minorities to be adopted in Europe and for them to have the same level of protection (applause) in our country that they have in the West. We are in favor of the codification of those rights, and then it will not be necessary to conclude agreements calling in question our position and our situation."

The Socialists' victory in Hungary means no change in policy regarding the minorities, Vladimir Meciar continued, and stressed that there will not be any staking out [of Hungarian-inhabited territory] by means of signposts! "We also find distressing the questions of guarantees of democracy. We are turning to citizens before decisive moments. We did not seek parliamentary intrigues, the disintegration of other parties, and the infliction of damage on our competitors. We were looking for a way of expressing the citizens' will. A constitutional law has been passed, according to which there will be elections. As we see, however, pressure for the acquisition of 90 votes [needed to pass constitutional laws] continues in the National Council, and, as this pressure keeps growing, fears justifiedly arise about whether we will be able to defend the election date on parliamentary soil, so that the elections really take place on 30 September 1994. Therefore, as soon as the law on referendum is passed, we will initiate a new collection of signatures for a referendum. (applause)"

### There Should Have Been a Referendum

Meciar explained how they became convinced that the referendum should have been called. The number of valid signatures that were collected was sufficient: 372,000. He said that the government's travels were very costly, adding that "they travel because they know it is the last time." And how did Vladimir Meciar assess some economic steps of the government? "We are rightly distressed by what the government has done. While they proclaimed that they would take over our policy and carry on what we had done, they are acting in the typical Moravcikite way—two steps on the spot, the suggestion of a step forward, and two steps back. Our policy was guided by a simple philosophy, which said that it is

impossible to economize any more and that, to be able to spend more, it is necessary to earn more money and to raise earnings. The present government's policy says that it is still necessary to save. These savings should squeeze out of citizens about 7.5 billion korunas, which will be felt mainly by poor people who cannot afford it. But entrepreneurs should not think that this does not concern them because, when the tax on repairs and services, including public catering, goes up 20 percent, their market will be reduced in size and many small businessmen will be driven by this policy to bankruptcy. (....) Because the government neglects monetary flows, bank credits are becoming more expensive, and the interest rate on loans has reached 30 percent.... We cannot agree with that. Nor do we identify with the approach toward privatization. (....) We are against pseudoprivatization."

Turning to the HZDS program, Meciar said: "We do not renounce the national program, but it is not the sole pillar; it is one of the pillars of our program. The time has not yet come for us to say that the state has become so stable that everything has been resolved. As long as the process of definite stabilization is not completed, we do not have the right to renounce this program, in contrast to those who do not want to respect either the state or the national program." [sentence as published] (applause)

**Sixth Government in Four Years**

At the close of his address, the movement's chairman said: "We consider it appropriate to adopt, shortly after the elections, measures to stabilize the political system. The Slovak Republic cannot continue like this. It will have the sixth government and the fourth parliament in four years. This brings enormous losses, which are also expressed in terms of money." And, before [moderator of HZDS rallies] Gabo Zelenay grabbed his microphone for a while, he said: "We do not have a program for ourselves, we have it for Slovakia. (applause) We are not going to fight against Weiss or Carnogursky. We want to fight for the Slovak Republic." (applause)

It was time for the citizens' questions. [passage omitted] An interesting question was addressed to Meciar: What should be done with deputies so they do not betray again? "First of all, a law will have to be passed regulating the loss of mandate [of deputies who leave the party for which they ran in the elections] because moral and ethical norms have insufficient impact. A group of subversives cannot be allowed to seek the state's weakness in the weaknesses of people. [sentence as published] We assure you that instances of suspected corruption of people who have left us will all be investigated." [passage omitted]

[Former Defense Minister] Imrich Andrejcak received questions bearing out that, even in the Army, not everything can be kept secret. "Why did the president appoint Docent Zak, an officer of Czech nationality, as rector of the Military Academy at Liptovsky Mikulas? Do we not have enough Slovak officers? He was appointed because he had been proposed by the minister of defense, and we do have Slovak officers. The same mistake occurred in Kosice [seat of the Air Force Academy]. The rector there is admittedly a Slovak, but a person who cannot himself fly is training pilots there. (laughter) Under Docent Zak, teaching in the Czech language was resumed in Liptovsky Mikulas (booing) and is being tolerated despite Slovak officers' protests. (....) Here is one long question, which I am not going to read. I will only say in response that I will propose to our deputies in parliament that they initiate an inquiry into whether some functionaries of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are citizens of the Slovak Republic in the first place." (commotion in the hall) [passage omitted]

At the end, it was again Meciar's turn. Asked about the case of [Deputy Prime Minister] Roman Kovac, he replied: "He has not filed any suit against me thus far nor will he file one because he is afraid of it like the devil of holy water because many of us heard this admission. It is to this government and parliament's disgrace that they keep him among themselves. And it is also his personal disgrace." Replying to a question about the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], he said: "We do not identify the entire SDL with Weiss, Ftacnik, Siroky, and Dorotin. They represent a deviation [uchylka] in the SDL. SDL members should therefore ponder what to do when their leadership deflects." Asked whether it is true that [former chairman of the Public Against Violence Movement] Fedor Gal is Weiss's extended arm in Prague, he said: "I cannot confirm that because I have no information about it. What I do know, however, is that on Easter Monday in 1992, when the balance of power in Slovakia was already clear, Messrs. Weiss and Filkus had been invited to the president [Havel] for talks, the contents of which we have never been informed. Although we were party colleagues then, we do not know what happened at the Castle that day." He explained, furthermore, how two members could nonchalantly move from one government to the next: "They claim with haughty calm that everything is okay. They say with haughty calm that one must not be confrontational. At the same time, they regard as confrontational everyone who has a different point of view from that of the present Politburo. But evil must always be countered. Evil must be resisted even if that means confrontation. (applause) We are not transcending the limits of democracy, but we are not going to pretend that everything is in order only to avoid being labeled confrontational.... According to this government's understanding, being nonconfrontational and understanding means being stupid. Don't get excited, they tell us. We are only going to suck the blood out of you (laughter). True, that is exactly what they are doing with us. They have only taken money out of our pockets. They are only threatening us with the division of the state. They only undignifiedly represent us abroad and behave there as representatives who are incapable of managing their own affairs. They only damage social relations. Otherwise, they have done nothing to harm us, so why are we not satisfied? All of this is enough for them not to be where they are now. (....) For this reason, it is

necessary that this dispute be decided by the citizens as soon as possible, and we must consider which democratic means to use within the framework of the struggle against them." [passage omitted] The participants in the rally applauded. The three-hour marathon of words was coming to an end.

### Claims Support of Nine Deputies

*AU1006180994 Bratislava SME in Slovak 9 Jun 94 p 2*

[Article by "rk": "In Every Secret Ballot, Nine Coalition Deputies Supposedly Side With the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[Text] Bratislava—When giving consideration to post-election coalitions, we do not seclude ourselves from anyone, with the exception of Miklos Duray. The decision on who will be our partner will be made by the voter, Vladimir Meciar, deputy to the National Council of the Slovak Republic and chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], said at yesterday's "13 Plus One" meeting organized by the editorial staff of SLOBODNY PIATOK. According to what he said, the question of holding elections has not been definitely settled because "in the course of the current meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, our deputies have been approached by two people—Deputy Gburova, with the proposal that the election date be postponed by two years, and Deputy Bajan, with the request for four more [HZDS] deputies so that they get the 90 votes [needed to pass constitutional laws]." Vladimir Meciar also contested reports about nocturnal meetings of his government to approve privatization projects: "After the passage of the vote of no-confidence in us, we had dinner and a friendly chat about what we would do the next day. ... We were not approving any privatization projects; that had been done before, and even that concerned only four or five projects, I think, and I was not personally present." Meciar claimed that parliament is in a state of decay, which he supported by saying that, whenever there is a secret ballot in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, nine people vote along with the HZDS. Supposedly, these deputies only failed during the dismissal of the government, but they had already apologized to him and explained their reasons.

### Article Explains Differences in Poll Results

*AU1006152794 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 6 Jun 94 p 3*

[Article by Ludmila Benkovicova of the Slovak Statistical Office]

[Text] *We regularly publish the results of public opinion surveys conducted by various specialized institutions. Their results are not quite identical. We have asked Ludmila Benkovicova, of the Slovak Statistical Office, to compare the results and explain the differences in the methodology used. As she noted in an introductory letter to her article, she had consulted the problems under review with the FOCUS agency and Slovak Radio. As an important contribution of this activity, they agreed on the need to coordinate in the future at least the use of terminology because, as she writes, "the differences disconcert all of us."*

Why do different polls produce different results?

I will mention at least the most important factors influencing the ascertained results of public-opinion surveys.

Generally, it holds true that the obtained empirical data are significantly determined by the time of collection of information in the field. Public opinion is a dynamic phenomenon. It reacts with particular sensitivity to events in public and political life, new facts and information, politicians' statements and speeches. A shift of a few days in the collection of data, especially if these days are packed with political activities, can find its expression in changes of opinion among a part of the population and, hence, in altered results.

A problem in its own right is when to perceive differentiation of data as true differences and when certain differences are still within the norm. Some commentators and users interpret as a difference even a decline or rise by a few tenths of a percent.

It is necessary to clearly realize that surveys working with select samples—and this is true of all public-opinion surveys without exception—are surveys of likelihood nature [vyskumy pravdepodobnostneho charakteru]. They produce data, the validity of which is not absolute but that are always valid, with a certain probability within a certain interval of reliability. The interval of reliability has its lower and upper limit, and the figure that is given as the result is the midpoint of the interval. This means, for example, that the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], which, according to the May 1994 survey of the Slovak Statistical Office, availed itself of 11 percent of votes, would have received in "May" elections, with a likelihood of 95 percent (the margin of error is 5 percent!), 8.7-12.7 percent of the votes of participants in the elections.

The final results are also affected by the research method that is used, starting with the method of establishing the select sample, through the method of data collection, all the way down to the specific wording of the question put to the respondent.

Let us take a closer look at the questions used by various institutions. Slovak Radio's Research Department, whose electoral surveys frequently appear in the mass media, uses the following question: "Imagine that parliamentary elections were to take place this week. For which party or movement would you opt?" This question is put to every respondent. The respondent can select his reply from 20 entities running in the elections (out of more than 50 officially registered parties and movements). He is free to supplement his reply with any other party, but he can also reply "I am not going to

vote," "I do not want to reply," or "I do not know." The sum of all replies adds up to 100 percent.

The FOCUS agency asks two questions. In the first, it ascertains interest in participation in the elections, and, in the second, it surveys how the respondent would vote. It offers a choice of 15 entities running in the elections and, simultaneously, the replies "I am not going to vote," "I do not know for whom I will vote," and "I do not want to reply." The two questions are put to all people included in the select sample. By means of combining replies to the first and second questions, the FOCUS agency obtains the electoral preferences of individual parties.

The Slovak Statistical Office addresses to all citizens polled a question concerning their participation in the coming elections. The second question—"For which political party or movement would you vote if elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic were to be held today?"—is put to only those respondents who said at the time of the survey that they are determined to vote or that they are likely to vote. It offers a list of 18 entities running in the elections, the possibility of naming any party not included in the list, and the reply "I do not know for whom I will vote." The electoral decisions of those of the respondents who want to participate in the elections are then interpreted as electoral preferences. The aim of this methodological procedure is to come as close as possible to the actual "pure" situation of casting the vote.

The electoral results are directly determined by those who come to the ballot box. Even the most unbending sympathizer of a party cannot support "his" party with his vote if he does not turn up at the polling station. It would be appropriate to pay more heed to this trivial fact when presenting the results of preelection polls.

The use of a different term (such as, for example, "political sympathy," "political orientation of the population," etc.) could therefore be considered for expressing attitude. The term electoral preferences should be reserved for the electoral decisions of participants in the elections—that is, those who want to come to the ballot box on the last day of September or the first day of October.

The reality of the '94 elections will test not only the validity of various preelection prognoses but also the theoretical justification of the methods used. For the time being, the reader and user who is seriously interested in preelection surveys has no choice but to pay heed not only to the "figures" themselves, but also to the wording of the question, the wording of all of the optional replies, and to what each item of data actually expresses.

## Bomb Explodes at National Assembly Building

*LD1106114594 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Excerpts] A time bomb exploded during the night in Budapest at the National Assembly building. It blew to pieces gate number 19--the gate faces the Danube river—and it broke several of the building's windows. Experts have found among the debris components that were part of the bomb. [passage omitted]

In order not to jeopardize the investigation, the police have not revealed any further information for the time being. Hungarian President Arpad Goncz acquainted himself with the situation at the scene. Prime Minister Peter Boross was still in the building a few minutes ago.

Leading representatives of Hungarian political parties unequivocally condemned this act of terrorism and expressed their conviction that it was probably an act of madness by an individual and not linked to the results of the elections. Nonetheless, they urged the tightening of security regulations regarding the protection of the parliament.

## MDF Condemns Bomb Attack

*LD1106173994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Text] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] condemns the bombing carried out at the parliament building at dawn today. The MDF believes that there is no significant political force in Hungary today that would have an interest in creating confusion or disturbing the country's peace and order, the party communique stresses. The attempt could only have been carried out by an extremist individual or group, who or which cannot accept that the Hungarian nation, in free elections that were held for a second time, has decided in favor of multiparty parliamentary democracy.

## SZDSZ's Coalition Guidelines Published

*AU1306105994 Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian 9 Jun 94 p 23*

[Text] This is an abbreviated version of the 25 coalition guidelines that were laid down by the National Council of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] at the end of February. We literally quote the passages that the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], judging from its program, might argue about.

1. A new or reworded constitution "that is identical to the current one in its basic principles."

2. To appoint the ombudsmen.

3. To provide solid guarantees for judicial independence.

4. To curtail the power of commissioners of the Republic and increase the independence of local governments.

5. Independent media.

6. Quick and public privatization controlled by parliament. "The state's role as owner has to be cut back." "To support" the participation of foreign capital, and to ease the participation of "domestic entrepreneurs and investors" in privatization.

7. To stimulate growth with the help of stimulating investments, reducing taxes, and by helping local authority investments and housing construction and the underdeveloped regions to catch up. However, in the meantime, "the current budget deficit must not be allowed to increase any further," and efforts have to be made to reduce inflation.

8. To continue the policy of foreign economic opening and fitting in with the developed foreign market systems, and to renew our economic links with the East-Central European countries "in accordance with the realistic possibilities."

9. To support all forms of enterprises and ownership in agriculture which have proved successful.

10. To reduce unemployment; this viewpoint should also be asserted in privatization.

11. To preserve the value of pensions, reduce the differences of living standards caused by family size, and assist in finding first homes. Welfare benefits "have to be more targeted through normative regulations."

12. Overall economic and social agreement with the employers and the trade unions.

13. To stop corruption.

14. To make health care available for everyone. "To continue the privatization of health care services," "to finance hospitals regardless of the sector."

15. Freedom to establish and choose schools. To have a neutral world view in education. To extend the range of people in further education. To abolish the regional educational centers.

16. Culture and science: To have patronages, but no control of contents.

17. Diversity in world views. To guarantee the separation of church and state.

18. To set up national minority local governments.

19. Join NATO and the European Union. Improve relations with the neighboring countries. We do not intend to change the borders.

20. To support the Hungarians living beyond the borders also by relying on the democratic forces of the neighboring countries.

21. Overall reform of military forces. We will "adjust the size and character of the Army to the changed security and economic conditions."

22. To strengthen public security.

23. To have a cheap and modest state.

24. To have better relations with the opposition, forces outside parliament, and the interested representation bodies.

25. To seek the possibilities of national reconciliation and to close the past in a way acceptable for a large section of society.

## Horn Views Domestic, EU Membership Issues

*AU1106171294 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2013 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party and prime minister-designate, in the ORF studio in Innsbruck by Robert Hochner in the ORF studio in Vienna; date not given—recorded; Horn speaks in Hungarian with superimposed translation into German]

[Text] [Hochner] You had a car accident prior to the elections and are wearing a support cast. How can one make politics with such a straitjacket around one's head?

[Horn] To formulate what you said more precisely, let me say that I had the accident at the end of the election campaign, but it did not affect our election opportunities, and I am continuing my work with undiminished intensity. We are very busy and are now continuing our coalition talks with the Free Democrats.

[Hochner] For a Western European party it would be unusual to win the absolute majority and then insist on a coalition partner. Do you want a coalition partner because you do not want to bear responsibility alone for the possibly tough economic measures that Hungary may have to face?

[Horn] Perhaps this plays a certain role, but what is most important is the fact that Hungary needs a broad national basis and national consensus. We must put an end to the past practice of political parties attacking one another, instead of assuming joint responsibility for the country's difficult situation. We are convinced that we should form a coalition with the Free Democrats, and we hope that such a coalition will come about. This may mean that an entirely new relationship between the parties will develop. In 1989, the Hungarian Socialists and Free Democrats were virtually enemies, and now we have a chance to form a coalition. This is very important, has a symbolic significance, requires essential political activities, and may be a signal for other Central Eastern European countries.

[Hochner] Are you planning to pursue a radically Western economic policy, as has been represented by Czech Prime Minister Klaus and was practiced in Poland for a long time, or will you try to pursue a central course to keep the sacrifices of the people, above all the lower social classes, within bounds?

[Horn] Look, there are no worn-out roads, neither for the Czech Republic, nor for Hungary, nor for any other country. Here in Austria, the system developed over the centuries, whereas we must tear down the former system within a very short time. This is an unprecedented effort. Privatization in Central Eastern Europe is unprecedented in world history. We will, of course, follow the Western example.

We would like to reach the status reached by Austria or the other Western European countries. However, we will pursue specific policies, and in so doing, we must consider the people's capacity for tolerance. We must not allow the transformation and democratic development to take place in such a way that the people's living standard continuously deteriorates. A line must be drawn somewhere, and I think the program of the Socialists, which can be coordinated relatively easily with the program of the Free Democrats, promises this, and most voters believe in our program.

[Hochner] Your party is the successor party to the Hungarian Communists; it reconstituted itself. Aren't there in your party also representatives of the trade union wing, for instance, who would rather opt for a concept from the past and would perhaps prefer to return to the planned economy?

[Horn] I do not know any politician in Hungary who was born after the spring of 1990. Somehow every politician was involved with the former system, including the opposition and the trade unions. But the trade union leaders, the whole trade union movement, underwent a transformation, and trade unions in Hungary today, including the large trade union federation with which we have an alliance, correspond to their Western European counterparts.

The influence of the trade unions was represented only in a small segment of parliament. I do not think a government can be successful without having concluded a social partnership, a partnership with the representatives of employers and employees. If such a consensus does not come about on all problems of social policy, Hungary will face many social explosions. It is an existential problem for us to achieve consensus not only with trade unions but also with employers.

[Hochner] In Austria, there is currently much talk about its possible EU [European Union] membership. In your view, when will Hungary be a member of the EU—irrespective of the outcome of the referendum here?

[Horn] First of all, I would like to say that I envy the Austrians. I envy them for several reasons, but above all because they can already vote this Sunday [12 June] on whether or not they want to become EU members. I wish Hungary were in this situation. I am convinced that Europe is facing specific challenges, and Europe is advancing on the road to integration, and those who stay outside and do not take part will be disadvantaged. As for Hungary, I am convinced that, if these four countries become EU members in 1995, we may realistically

assume that we can start talks with Brussels on membership of the Central Eastern European countries, the so-called Visegrad states, early in 1997. Regrettably, we cannot expect membership before the end of this century, or this millennium. I would like to accelerate it, and if we could exchange some Austrian problems for our problems, we would readily take over your problems in exchange for our problems. But what is important is that we are both heading for a united Europe.

## MDF Officials on Party's Future Direction

*LD1206205994 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Interviews with Hungarian Democratic Forum leaders by unidentified correspondents; place and date not given; speakers identified by caption—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Sandor Lezsak, former executive deputy chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF] The fact that I have resigned the executive leadership of the Democratic Forum reflects my view that everybody should take stock as to what extent they were responsible for this very serious defeat. [passage omitted]

[Peter Boross, prime minister and member of the MDF Presidium] We have four years ahead of us during which we have to construct a modern, professional political party in the true European sense of the word by 1998—one that will be able to represent social interests to become a governing force again.

[Correspondent] To outsiders you represent the liberal line within the MDF, and now, you are the party's parliamentary group leader. Does this also mean a change in the political line?

[Finance Minister Tamas Szabo] I really respect the liberals, the national liberals working within our circle. Although I have never been a member of the Liberal Foundation, I have always played a serious role in the Christian democratic circle of the MDF, ever since it was formed. This is where my loyalty lies. [passage omitted] So in this respect, my person will not really bring change. [passage omitted]

Whenever there was trouble within the MDF, it was when somebody wanted to push one or the other of the MDF's three main ideological pillars—the national, the Christian democratic, and the national liberal ideology—to the forefront. If any of these trends becomes dominant the MDF is finished. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Does Peter Boross really represent another group within the MDF?

[Szabo] In my view, Peter Boross represents an extremely pragmatic line and has an enormous capacity for organizing. [passage omitted] He represents a fourth pragmatic wing and he, as a man thinking in terms of organizing and organization, approaches issues from a different angle. It is possible that he will have difficulties because every stream feels that he does not really represent any of them. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Does it mean, at the same time—since tendencies are linked to persons—that there is an unresolved debate in the MDF whether it should be a people's party, a program party, a party of law and order, or an action party? [passage omitted]

[MDF Chairman Lajos Fur] Obviously, it appears that winning the next election will be possible only with the oft-mentioned wider social basis, which is necessary in any case. Therefore, it is obvious that the MDF should move into the direction of a kind of people's party, which does not mean that the MDF will be a mass party in that it will have a mass membership, but that it should have a broad electoral basis; that it should put down roots in the various strata of the people, in the various social groups.

[Szabo] If anything can change in the MDF it is the fact that we will move in the direction of a completely balanced, modern conservativism, one that does not require a change in the order of values but demands a change of expression.

[MDF Deputy Balazs Horvath] The zealous and strong attitude—which, on more than one occasion has irritated people, often unnecessarily—which exaggerated the national feature will obviously weaken, will be pushed into the background, if not in substance certainly in form.

[Correspondent] Does the MDF's defeat mean the defeat of the unity of forces of national sentiments [nemzeti eroek] as well?

[Fur]] The forces of national sentiments competed in this last election in a rather fragmented way—at least they were divided into several parties—but if I add up the results of all the parties of this kind, then I must say that their result was not all that bad. After all, more than 1.5 million people voted out of the 5.6 million for these parties, which means that this kind of thinking or set of political ideologies already has a wide basis. Obviously this basis must be broadened because, as we have seen, an election cannot be won through this and in this way. Possibly the fragmentation, too, needs to be resolved in some form and the forces will have to be concentrated. [passage omitted]

## Horn Sends Message to Hungarians in Romania

*AU1006152994 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 10 Jun 94 p 3*

[Text] Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP], replied with a warm message to the congratulatory letter sent to him by Bela Marko, executive chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian], MAGYAR HIRLAP was informed by the office of the RMDSZ chairman.

Expressing thanks for the good wishes expressed on behalf of the RMDSZ, Horn pointed out in his letter that his party has always followed with great attention and sympathy the "heroic struggle of the RMDSZ for the survival of the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania and the full assertion of their individual and community rights," and that the MSZP has endeavored to support all this with their available means. Gyula Horn assured Bela Marko and the RMDSZ of the fact that "supporting the vital autonomy efforts of the Hungarians living beyond the borders" is one of the outstanding goals of the Socialists' government program. The MSZP is determined to do everything in its power to successfully assert this in the increased government responsibility of the party. Gyula Horn expressed his hope that he would be soon able to discuss the issue of "effective RMDSZ-MSZP cooperation" personally with Bela Marko.

### Weapons Said Found in Aid Shipment for Novi Sad

*LD1106172794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Excerpts] According to a report on Novi Sad Television, weapons and military equipment have been discovered in aid sent by the Hungarian Ecumenical Charity [Magyar Ekumenikus Szeretetszolgalat]. The discovery was made during a customs and control inspection in Novi Sad. Our correspondent Szilveszter Varga, reporting from Belgrade, also gives an account of the continuing fighting in Bosnia.

[Begin Varga recording] [passage omitted] According to a report by Novi Sad Television yesterday, 15 Belgian-made submachine guns, more than 1,000 uniforms of the former East German Army, and other military equipment were found by Novi Sad customs officers in one of the three trucks the Budapest Ecumenical Charity sent to Kosovo. Representatives of the Hungarian aid organization—which also has links with the Pravoslav Church—stationed here have dissociated themselves from the affair. [end recording]

MTI's Belgrade correspondent also reported, on the basis of the Novi Sad Television account, that the aid delivery containing the military equipment was sent by the Hungarian Ecumenical Charity from Budapest to the Pristina-based Mother Teresa organization and that the documentation was signed by a Balazs Kek.

The Hungarian Ecumenical Charity resolutely denies and describes as provocative the Novi Sad Television report, which said that weapons and military equipment weighing 10 tons were found in their aid delivery during customs inspection. The charity also stresses that the delivery was made up of clothes, medicines, and food, and was not being sent to Pristina, the mostly Albanian-populated center of Kosovo, but to Novi Sad.

Following the regular customs inspection last Saturday [4 June] the Yugoslav customs inspectors found both the documents and the delivery itself to have been in proper order because after off-loading, the trucks returned to Hungary. [sentence as heard]

### Strategy, Defense Research Chief Interviewed

*94CH0266A Budapest PESTI HIRLAP in Hungarian 7-8 May 94 p 11*

[Interview with Ferenc Gazdag, director of the Strategy and Defense Research Institute, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given—first paragraph is PESTI HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] According to Ferenc Gazdag, director of the Strategy and Defense Research Institute [SVKI], the change of political systems has demonstrated the need for research institutes in the social sciences, institutes that promote the flow of comprehensive information and are also able to provide background analyses and forecasts quickly and accurately. At our request the director discussed one of the institute's most recent research studies—of the present state of the Ukrainian Army.

[PESTI HIRLAP] Sir, why was your institute established?

[Gazdag] The purpose of a research institute within a ministry's staff organization is to offer ideas and analyses to the ministry's political leadership, to demonstrate processes, and perhaps to prepare forecasts. It follows from the Defense Ministry's functions that we have to concern ourselves primarily with questions of national defense and security policy. In other words, the ministry's purview determines our work. Consequently, we are interested in all questions related to our country's defense and security and its system of relations with countries both near and far. We are studying particularly the questions of Hungary's security and also Central European, European, and global security.

[PESTI HIRLAP] How systematic are your relations with the Ministry of Defense? How frequently does the ministry request analyses from your institute?

[Gazdag] Regrettably, a system of bilateral relations has not yet fully evolved. We prepare annual research plans, which are approved, respectively, by all the main departments within the ministry and by the state secretaries. Thus we have an approved research plan that is based in part on the types of research the ministry needs; we also suggest certain research topics. To tell the whole truth, however, our institute was established in 1990; we first have to develop and deploy our capacities, and only then will this bilateral process be able to function. At present, the ministry itself often does not know what it needs. Despite the substantial investment, one can never be certain about the return on it. After all, our research results appear in long-term studies, analyses, and books.

[PESTI HIRLAP] What is your budget?

[Gazdag] We receive 20 million forints annually from the ministry, and our entire staff consists of 12 people at present. If we take into consideration that, since 1990, the ministry's budget has been declining gradually in real terms, it is conceivable that there will be changes at our institute within the foreseeable future.

[PESTI HIRLAP] What are the institute's current research programs?

[Gazdag] I think it will suffice to list our principal directions of research. The first principal direction is the evergreen topic of the defense of the Republic of Hungary. The second principal direction is the security of Central Europe and of Europe proper. Incidentally, we are now preparing a conference, and a large volume of conference reports, both to be called *The Security of Central Europe 1994* [Kozep-Europa biztonsaga 1994]. New challenges, new dangers, and risks is what we call our third principal direction of research. We have to take into account that the world, or at least the immediate world around us, has not become any more secure, even though the bipolar system has disintegrated, the period of great military threats is over, and NATO and the Warsaw Pact are no longer confronting each other. Instead of the great nuclear threat, there now are many small but real threats. These threats involve many things that are not military factors, yet researchers must take note of them. The problem of refugees, for instance, also has security implications. Our fourth principal direction of research is the process of modernizing combat materiel and the structure of armed forces. Such research is definitely for the Hungarian Armed Forces. There is also a fifth, interesting and new area of research in which we are investigating the connection, the system of relations, between the armed forces and society. Research in this area became known in Hungary only a few years ago.

Over and above the principal directions of research, each of my colleagues has a favorite research topic he likes to pursue. Andras Balogh, for instance, is investigating the relationship between minorities and security; a lengthy article of his on this subject appeared in VALOSAG not so long ago. Another colleague is investigating the psychological aspects of security-policy conflicts; he, too, published his results recently in what has become the well-known Braun report.

Of course, we are also allowed to investigate topics that are not so prominently in the forefront of everyday thinking. Let me give you an example. Much as it is desirable for us to take part in European integration, it also raises many factors of uncertainty. Therefore it is our duty to investigate already now, for instance, what burdens would devolve on us from the realization of Hungary's strategic objective of attaining NATO membership. The average NATO country is spending 3 percent of its national income on defense, whereas Hungary is spending merely 1.6 or 1.7 percent. Which means that we would have to at least double our military budget if we wanted to upgrade the Hungarian Armed Forces ideally to NATO standards.

[PESTI HIRLAP] Is the distribution of your institute's studies and reports restricted to the Ministry of Defense, or do members of the opposition also have access to them?

[Gazdag] Members of the National Assembly's Defense and Foreign Affairs Committees, and central agencies receive our reports by virtue of their office. Upon request, we gladly make our research results available to the expert of any party, regardless of his party affiliation. At the moment we are distributing our publications free of charge to officials on our distribution list, but we are also planning to make our publications available for sale to the interested public. As an example, let me mention that, with the help of NATO's Information Department, we recently published the NATO manual that explains how NATO functions. The manual was so successful that we have decided to print a second edition, but we will be charging a small fee for its copies, instead of distributing them free of charge.

[PESTI HIRLAP] What are your relations like with other institutions of the Hungarian Armed Forces and with civilian research institutes at home and abroad?

[Gazdag] Research work is interactive. When someone discovers something, he is in contact with very many people and is working in a system of constant feedback. Most of my colleagues are teaching at universities, both civilian and military ones. We regard the Hungarian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense as our customers whose requests we try to satisfy as comprehensively as possible. We like to rely on the work of our partner institutes, primarily on the Foreign Affairs Institute and the World Economy Research Institute. Our relations are outstanding with similar institutes in the neighboring countries. We often receive guest researchers; most recently, for example, we had colleagues visiting us from Poland.

[PESTI HIRLAP] To our knowledge, members of your institute visited Ukraine recently. What experience have they gained there?

[Gazdag] There are very many forms of cooperation, including the mutual exchange of research materials, analyses, and studies. Last fall, for instance, a delegation of the Ukrainian General Staff's Scientific Directorate came to our country for consultations lasting several days. In return, Hungarian security policy experts were invited to Kiev for discussions, on 26 through 28 April. Representing our institute, Colonel Dr. Laszlo Nagy was a member of the Hungarian delegation. Besides meetings with the official Ukrainian delegation, he held talks also with the heads of the International Research Institute of Regional and Global Security and with the military-policy adviser to the Ukrainian minister of defense.

During the consultations, our experts gained much valuable information on Ukraine's security policy and the state of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They established that Ukraine is in an extremely difficult situation. The recession, inflation, insolvency, and dependence on

Russia are very serious. Yet our partners in the consultations were a bit more optimistic than a year ago. They told us that the recession had bottomed out in some areas and that the country had not collapsed under the successive crises. The rate of inflation has slowed slightly. The parliamentary elections took place without any serious disruptions, and four-fifths of the 450 seats have been filled. The institutions of public administration have become stabilized, and the legislative backlog has been reduced to some extent. Although disputes with Russia are continuing with undiminished intensity, matters have not come to a head, and there remains the possibility of a negotiated settlement for every controversial issue.

Ukraine's international political assessment is improving, and its bilateral relations with the neighboring smaller countries are good. During the past two years and also at present, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have been undergoing substantive reform, but the process is by no means a smooth one. The trouble started with Ukraine's inheriting a randomly grouped part of the Soviet Armed Forces that happened to be on Ukrainian territory when Ukraine became independent, rather than an integrated army that gradually evolved in the course of Ukrainian history, in organic unity with society. According to our Ukrainian partners, their concept of having to reform their inherited armed forces was a mistake. It would have been better to aim immediately for complete reorganization and reconstruction.

This realization was two years late in coming; the euphoria of the initial period after declaring independence was not always accompanied by well-founded decisions, and a comprehensive conceptual plan was lacking. Work was hampered, for instance, by the decision that in 1992 the personnel of the Ministry of Defense could be brought up to only 50 percent of its original size. The strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces gradually declined, from more than 650,000 at the time of independence to about 450,000 at present. In addition to the Army, there is also a National Guard about 50,000 strong. On the American model, the National Guard is able to reinforce the police primarily in emergency situations, without actually having to deploy the Army itself.

[PESTI HIRLAP] In the case of Ukraine, nuclear weapons pose a separate problem.

[Gazdag] That is true. The trilateral agreement signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the United States in January, on Kiev's accession to the START I Treaty, has calmed tempers. Two shipments of nuclear warheads have already arrived in Russian since then, and Ukraine has received the promised fuel for its nuclear power plants. Kiev has undertaken to fully disarm itself of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the schedule specified in the START treaties. (In other words, Ukraine—unlike Russia—will not be retaining any nuclear weapons.)

On the other hand, Ukraine is not yet willing to accede to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, although Ukrainian aversion to it seems to be diminishing. It is conceivable that Ukraine might revise its standpoint in the near future. Ukrainian policy on nuclear weapons, which is not always clear, has another aspect. In conjunction with the trilateral agreement signed in Moscow, there is a Ukrainian notion that appears to be spreading among military policy experts. It holds that only mediation by a third party could offer hope of any progress in resolving the controversial questions between Ukraine and Russia.

The advocates of this theory would like to involve at all cost a third party in the dispute over Crimea and the Black Sea fleet. The ideal third party would be the United States; should it decline to participate, however, the United Nations or some other international organization could also come into consideration. This theory is dangerous in the sense that Ukraine might try to delay its nuclear disarmament in an attempt to persuade Washington to enter the Ukrainian-Russian dispute. Although the United States has categorically stated on several occasions that it would not let itself be blackmailed, the possibility cannot be excluded that Kiev might resort to the questionable method of a tie-in sale.

Such a step would considerably destabilize relations primarily between Russia and Ukraine, which would not be indifferent from our country's point of view. Otherwise, Kiev regards as reassuring the development and existence of parallel European structures (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, etc.), but finds all this inadequate to offset Moscow's growing efforts at reintegrating the Soviet republics. Incidentally, Ukraine is the only associate member of the CIS beside the Commonwealth's 11 regular members.

[PESTI HIRLAP] The information you have just outlined is merely of general interest at present. But how useful is all this to the SVKI?

[Gazdag] It is very useful in our work, primarily in developing optimal conceptual plans for our country's security policy. I have already mentioned that the SVKI is organizing an international conference on Central European security, to be held in Budapest on 16 and 17 May. Perhaps the most important item on the conference's agenda will be a comparative analysis of the conceptual security policy plans of the countries within the region. I will cite merely one fact to illustrate how serious this conference will be: NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and also the Marshall Center—an American research base established in Germany last year—have already informed us that they would attend.

## Foreign Minister on Istanbul NACC Meting

*LD1006212294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1716 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Article by Jacek Safuta]

[Excerpt] Istanbul, 10 Jun, PAP—At their meeting in Istanbul on Friday, the foreign ministers of the NATO, Central European, and former USSR states, who make up the so-called North Atlantic Consultative Council [NACC], with unprecedented stubbornness disputed the text of the final communique, which extended the proceedings.

This pushed into the background the resolution of the nature of relations between Russia and NATO, although the issue has remained unclear. Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski stressed in his speech on Friday that Poland is "aware of the need for solid partnership between NATO and Russia," within and beyond the Partnership for Peace, but he warned that this should not lead to a "marginalizing of the smaller states, undermining their trust in NATO." He also gave assurances that countries such as Poland "want to join NATO not as frontline states but as factors promoting further cooperation." [passage omitted]

## Sejm Commission Chief on New Constitution

*PM1306104094 Lodz GLOS PORANNY in Polish 6 Jun 94 p 6*

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Jerzy Jaskiernia, chairman of the Sejm Legislative Commission, by Henryk Sroczynski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Sroczynski] The question of the president's powers is probably one of the most important, and at the same time most controversial, issues in the work on the new constitution....

[Jaskiernia] Indeed, the question of the president's rights is a key issue and is certain to generate many arguments. Different functions are attached to the office of president in different systems. In a presidential system of the kind obtaining in the United States, the president discharges the function of head of the executive power—that is, he actually directs the government. On the other hand, in the parliamentary-cabinet system, the president is more a symbolic head of state. His function is to carry out certain ceremonial duties and grant top academic and other titles and highest military ranks; he is also the supreme commander of the armed forces. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] opts for the latter model.

[Sroczynski] What motivates the Left to make this choice?

[Jaskiernia] We postulate a weaker position for the president because we see the government and the prime minister as the principal carriers of the executive power. In our opinion, the public should know precisely who governs the country: the president or the prime minister.

[Sroczynski] Have we not known that hitherto?

[Jaskiernia] For the past few years, we have had a situation in Poland whereby the president could say that he was not able to realize his election campaign promises because he does not have sufficient powers as a result of the government's intervention. The government, in turn, claims that it cannot discharge its obligation to administer the country because the president interferes in various areas of its competence.

[Sroczynski] As a result, you are proposing to introduce a classical system of a combined parliament-cabinet rule, in which the president's function will be more symbolic than real.

[Jaskiernia] We adopt the classical configuration in which the president's function is weaker, but we also allow for a certain reinforcement of that function. First, we assume that the president will be elected by the whole of society in a general ballot. We have chosen that option, even though it is not strictly necessary with the president's current range of competence. Second, we allow for a more active role to be played by the president in a conflict situation—that is, at a time when we are unable to form a government. This should give him a chance to become a mediator.

[Sroczynski] Only in that kind of situation?

[Jaskiernia] I believe that, as soon as conflicts of that sort cease occurring, the president ought to withdraw into the wings and leave the stage to the government, giving it full freedom to act. Why should the president be an obstacle to the government's discharging its administrative duties?

[Sroczynski] Does Lech Walesa's personality not influence the left's decisions on which powers to give to the president?

[Jaskiernia] We are trying to draft a new constitution that is free from "personality conditioning." In other words, as we formulate the constitution, we leave out the question of Lech Walesa's personality. Furthermore, we have never discussed the president's range of competence with the aim of weakening his position. Anyone who watches the results of public-opinion polls will know that the ranking list is headed by SLD candidate Aleksander Kwasniewski. So it is not altogether certain who will be elected the next president. We believe that the public should have a clear-cut picture of who is responsible for the state administration. Personally, I am a firm opponent of a twofold, or diarchic, power structure. To apply soccer-derived vocabulary to such a structure, you can say that it is easiest to place the ball between the goalposts when there are two defense players. This situation of "splitting the defense" is most characteristic of a system where the president has a considerable range of competence, parallel, as it were, to the government's competences. In the FRG, there is no doubt that the chancellor is responsible for the state administration. In Britain, everyone knows that the

prime minister runs the country's affairs, and no one expects the queen to do so. Why should we opt for a system that causes constant confusion about who is in charge?

[Sroczynski] Because the question of the range of competence of our top political figures and institutions generates such controversies and conflicts, is there not a danger that it will also delay the work on drafting the new constitution?

[Jaskiernia] If both sides show goodwill, the constitution could be promulgated in May or June of next year. The procedure approved by the Sejm for adopting a constitution is of a very democratic nature. Unfortunately, this creates the opportunity for delaying the work at every stage—and, if someone wished to do so for some malicious reason, he could well succeed. Such a boycott, based on exploiting various procedural loopholes, gaps, and opportunities, could cause a considerable delay in the work on the constitution and even lead to a situation whereby its promulgation by the present parliament is in question.

[Sroczynski] Is your vision not unduly pessimistic?

[Jaskiernia] Perhaps it is, but the possibility of such a situation cannot be precluded.

[Sroczynski] What other surprises do you think there could be?

[Jaskiernia] I also allow for the possibility of a certain paradoxical situation, which some people are already predicting. It is obvious that the president's representative on the Constitutional Commission will opt for a strong position for the president. In turn, the Center Accord [PC] will attempt to minimize the president's role in its own preferred version of the constitution. It is already clear that the division line will be quite complex. It is not only the left-wing orientation that opts for a weaker position for the president. Consequently, there is some speculation that, having realized that he has no reasonable chance of being elected within the framework of a strong presidential power system, Lech Walesa could still change his mind and pronounce himself in favor of the weaker presidential power option.

[Sroczynski] Do you mean that this could be the lesson we might yet learn from the outcome of the settlements reached during the roundtable talks?

[Jaskiernia] It may be that it will be necessary to abandon certain positions in order to avoid falling again into the trap into which Lech Walesa fell precisely during the roundtable negotiations. At that time, he was in favor of weak powers for the president because that office was then set aside for General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Later, after a short period of General Jaruzelski's presidency, he assumed that position himself, with its restricted powers, and immediately began to complain that his range of competence was too restricted. If he had taken a long-term view during the roundtable talks, he would have had no reason for complaint. On the other hand, we distance ourselves from making tactical, person-oriented moves, and, while we do not attempt to adjust the proposed presidential powers to the personality of any particular candidate, we nevertheless intend to build the state system according to logical and reasonable principles.

## Sejm Adopts Amendment Easing Antiabortion Law

*LD1006200694 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1942 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Warsaw, 10 Jun—The Sejm adopted an amendment to the Penal Code today that permits abortion in the event of the woman's "difficult living conditions or complicated personal situation." The act was adopted as proposed by the Parliamentary Women's Group and supported by more than 200 deputies. Two hundred and forty-one deputies voted for the act, 107 were against, and 32 abstained.

## Main Coalition Parties Divided Over Concordat

*LD1106190794 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1730 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has asked the Sejm Presidium to postpone the debate on the ratification of the concordat with the Vatican until after the new Constitution is adopted. The discussion has been planned for 2 July. In this situation, a vote will most probably be held during the nearest Sejm session in order to reschedule this date.

[Unidentified correspondent] To justify its motion, the SLD quotes the civil rights ombudsman who has written to the Sejm Speaker saying that the ratification of the concordat before the adoption of the new constitution will lead to discrepancies in the regulations defining the relations between the state and the church. In this situation, according to the SLD, the new constitution should be adopted first, and the concordat should be dealt with afterward.

[SLD Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski] "This is a better solution. It will avert the reservations that the concordat is arousing today, and it will give priority to the basic law, which the constitution is. At the same time, all of this may happen according to realistic deadlines. In not more than a year, we can have both the constitution and, later, a serious debate on the concordat.

We do not want either a religious or an ideological war. We simply want to dissuade doubts that the people in Poland have, and we need time to do this. I think this procedure will be better."

[Correspondent] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] believes that the issue of the ratification should be dealt

with as soon as possible, and it intends to vote against the proposal put forward by its partner in the coalition.

[Janusz Dobrosz, chairman of the PSL parliamentary floor group] "We are in favor of making a decision on the issue of the concordat by the Sejm. This is a democratic choice: Either we are for the ratification of the concordat, or we are against it. However, delaying the matter—and this is how the motion put forward by the SLD can be understood—will not benefit anything but will arouse emotions and result in other important issues being treated as secondary."

[Correspondent] The SLD's motion will most probably be supported by the Union of Labor. One can expect that, apart from the PSL, also the Confederation for an Independent Poland and the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, as well as an overwhelming majority of deputies from the Freedom Union, will vote against the postponement of the debate on the concordat. In the Sejm, the number of opponents of the concordat is almost equal to the number of its supporters. Thus, it is difficult to predict the outcome of the vote on the postponement of the debate.

### SLD Wants Constitution First

*LD1106121994 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1114 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Text] Warsaw, 11 Jun—The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] parliamentary floor group today submitted a motion to the Sejm Presidium for "postponing the first reading of the bill on the ratification of the concordat between the Holy See and the Polish Republic until after a new constitution of the Polish Republic comes into force," group Chairman Aleksander Kwasniewski told journalists. Earlier it was said at the Sejm that the debate on the concordat would be held on 2 July.

Kwasniewski said that this step was not directed against the church or the believers, and it was not aiming at stirring up a war over outlooks on life. He added that it intended to lead to the situation when the concordat "will be freed from public doubts, also expressed during the campaign before the 19 September general election."

### UPR's Korwin-Mikke on Tax, Social Policies

*PM1306102094 Gdansk DZIENNIK BALTYCKI in Polish 3 Jun 94 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Janusz Korwin-Mikke, chairman of Union for Real Politics, by correspondent Barbara Szczepula; place and date not given]

[Text] [Szczepula] To begin with, let us talk about money. About our money. A few days ago, Minister Modzelewski announced his intention to increase the real estate tax to 10 percent....

[Korwin-Mikke] That announcement was simply unbelievable. I even suspect that Minister Modzelewski did it to spite the government coalition and expose it to ridicule because, as we know, they want to dismiss him and have already given him his notice. Ten percent! No one imposes real estate taxes of such magnitude, not even an occupying force. It is a forced contribution levied on a nation, and a very high contribution at that. It is dreadful!

[Szczepula] Not everyone sees it in the same way. During a meeting at the "Zak" club, a young man pointed out to you that the proposed tax applies exclusively to tenement-house owners, and, because he did not own a tenement house, he was not at all affected by the thing.

[Korwin-Mikke] And I asked him: And where do you live? Under a bridge? Because, unless the youth in question lives under a bridge, the real estate tax will affect him as well. This is because the owner of the house where our hero lives will naturally include the costs of the tax in his tenants' rents. And that will happen regardless of whether the owner is an individual, a housing cooperative, or a local authority. You must understand the simple truth that that tax will not be paid by the wealthy tenement house owners, land owners, and so on. The tax will be paid by the consumer. It will be factored into the costs of bread, rent, shoes, and gasoline. And one other thing. I recall an exchange of correspondence with a reader resident in California, published a while ago by one of our weeklies. It concerned a referendum on lowering the real estate tax in California. Our inquisitive compatriot, who was a correspondent of the weekly in question, asked a none-too-affluent-looking local resident whether he had voted for or against the lowering of the real estate tax. "I voted for it," was the reply. "Do you yourself own any real estate?" our inquisitive reporter wanted to know. "I don't, but I could," was the reply.

[Szczepula] But, considering that it has not yet been decided when the tax in question should be imposed, we can still hope that we can last out until then. Just as in the story about the man sentenced to death by the sultan, who, in exchange for having the execution of the sentence postponed for a year, undertook to teach a monkey to speak. When asked how he proposed to make good his undertaking, he answered that he would worry about that later because, in the course of the year, the sultan could die—or the monkey or himself. Consequently, we can still cherish the hope that the sultan or the monkey will die before the new tax on real estate is brought into practice, and that we will outlive them. "Lower taxes" is the standard motto of your movement, but not all of your proposals have met with the same public approval. I am thinking here of the recommendation that the price of vodka be drastically lowered. People are rather shocked by such proposals. They reason as follows: "Cheaper vodka will be tantamount to more extensive alcoholism in society."

[Korwin-Mikke] That kind of reasoning is erroneous. Just as an increase in the price of vodka does not cut its consumption, so its decrease will not raise it at all. On the other hand, we should indeed examine the reasons

that vodka is so expensive. It is 10 times more expensive than it should be. Well, it is because of the monopoly tax. Which is truly horrendous.

In any case, what is the result of the fact that the price of vodka is so high? Smugglers bring liquor to Poland illegally, while our own distilleries stand idle. This is because farmers are unable to sell their potatoes or rye grain. The industry suffers. The bureaucratic machine rakes in the money for the vodka. As a result, the poor families—because the families of alcoholics are always poor—suffer. If vodka were cheaper, perhaps our alcoholics would be able to put some money aside rather than spend it all on alcohol and, in this way, keep it for their wives and their children. Please note how many people profit from the organized smuggling of vodka to Poland. On the other hand, if we were to lower the price of alcohol, smugglers would take our vodka out of the country, and so the distilleries would profit and the farmers would profit.... In other words, a normal situation would prevail.

[Szczepula] You insist that taxes are the true measure of our freedom. The lower the taxes, the more freedoms available to the citizens. This kind of reasoning would suggest that the Swedes are the most captive nation in our world: After all, they pay as much as 80 percent of their incomes in taxes.

[Korwin-Mikke] Precisely. The Swedes and the Poles. Seen from the inside, Sweden presents a horrific picture.

[Szczepula] What do you mean by this? For many of our compatriots, Sweden is the nearest equivalent to a paradise on earth.

[Korwin-Mikke] Swedish society is a captive society. Something along the lines of Huxley's *Brave New World.* However, there is one fundamental difference between Sweden and Poland. Sweden is a wealthy country, having made its fortune by selling iron ore abroad during the two world wars. So it has enough money to be able to afford to lose some. On the other hand, we do not have the resources from which to finance socialism.

[Szczepula] The Union for Real Politics [UPR] wants to do away with socialism and introduce capitalism on a large scale, but the latest election showed that people do not want capitalism. After all, they voted for the left-wing orientation.

[Korwin-Mikke] But why did they do so? Because the people who ruled Poland recently were akin in their views to the U.S. Democrats. They claimed that they were building capitalism in Poland. But, in fact, they took as many loans as they could, they got rid of their Syrena cars and bought Volvos instead, and they kept on traveling toward socialism. Or, rather, Eurosocialism. So it was a ride in a larger and better vehicle, but it was still a ride in the wrong direction. Therefore, people got confused. In any case, after 45 years of life under real socialism, it is very difficult to accept the truth that there is no such thing as a free lunch.

[Szczepula] On the other hand, UPR proposes the introduction of capitalism, and people are afraid of that. For example, your plans to privatize all schools make people recoil in horror. Teachers are afraid that they will lose their jobs; parents are afraid that they will not be able to afford to pay for their children's educations.

[Korwin-Mikke] You are now citing a classical example of demagoguery promoted by the Polish Teachers Association. There will be smaller classes in private schools, which means that there will be a need for more teachers.

[Szczepula] But parents have their fears, too.

[Korwin-Mikke] Statistically speaking, parents spend on average some 700,000 złotys [Z] per child per month in a publicly owned school. This money is not paid directly to the school but is hidden in taxes: in gasoline, electricity, vodka, and so on. Out of that sum, about Z300,000-400,000 reach the school. The rest is swallowed by the bureaucratic machine. If parents could keep that sum of Z700,000—or even Z600,000—in their pockets, they would be able to pay Z500,000 in school fees and still have Z100,000 with which to buy, say, books for the child. At the same time, the school would still be getting much more money than it gets nowadays. At the moment, parents support huge crowds of officials from the Ministry of Education and local education authorities with the money they pay in taxes. In addition, that money is spent on supporting people who make controversial decisions about their children's educations contrary to the parents' wishes.

[Szczepula] Let us now talk about values and principles. The blue cross of St. George, which figures on your party's flag, is said to symbolize your fight for principles. What principles are these?

[Korwin-Mikke] St. George gave his energies to fight the dragon. The fact that in Polish the words "dragon" [smok] and "socialism" start with the same letter "s" is, of course, coincidental. As a symbol of our fight, St. George has one obvious advantage: According to the Vatican, he never existed at all. So no one will be able to accuse us of anticlericalism. The principles for which we fight are as follows: freedom, the right to own property, and justice.

[Szczepula] Do you mean social justice?

[Korwin-Mikke] Oh, no, anything but that.

[Szczepula] But what is the difference between social justice and plain justice?

[Korwin-Mikke] There are two ways of looking at it. Either social justice is the same as plain justice, and then the adjective "social" becomes superfluous, or social justice is something different from plain justice, which would indicate that it is, in fact, injustice. For example, justice would dictate that Kowalski be remunerated for his work on the one hand and punished for the crime of homicide by hanging on the other. In turn, injustice, which is another word for social justice, would insist that

all of the Kowalskis who earn, say, Z1.4 million per month, receive benefits and privileges just because they are low-paid. But, among all of these Kowalskis, there may be some who try but just cannot earn more and some who do not even feel like trying. Justice cannot be collective.

[Szczepula] The abortion issue has returned to the Sejm again. The ruling coalition intends to take advantage of it—for political reasons—in the forthcoming local self-government election. UPR is against abortion.

[Korwin-Mikke] Yes, we are. We believe that there should be a clear provision in our legislation stating that the Polish state is not in favor of abortion. UPR supports women. We are interested in securing a law that will stop men blackmailing women by saying: "If you do not have an abortion, I will leave you." At present, thanks to the law on protection of the unborn child, men find it more difficult to force women to make such decisions. In the meantime, life itself has shown that the infanticide statistics have not gone up as predicted by feminists. Of course, pathological cases do happen still, but these have always happened regardless of legislation.

Let me make myself clear. We do not propose that women be punished for abortion. Definitely not. We recommend that the Israeli model be adopted in our practice. In Israel, abortion is a punishable offense, but the courts almost never resort to making use of the relevant paragraph of the penal code. But they still call evil by its name.

[Szczepula] Let us turn again to current political issues. Most observers would nominate Aleksander Kwasniewski as the Left's principal candidate for the office of president. You, on the other hand, claim that the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] will officially nominate Jozef Oleksy.

[Korwin-Mikke] I am convinced that that is what will happen. Mr. Oleksy is simply a more suitable candidate for the function of "the father of the nation": He genuflects in churches and has a generally winsome personality.... On the other hand, Mr. Kwasniewski, with his ladder-climbing feats [reference to Kwasniewski's recent attempt at avoiding media attention after a major political meeting] is surely a less serious candidate.

[Szczepula] Does Oleksy stand a chance?

[Korwin-Mikke) He does, provided some disaster occurs—such as Mr. Walesa's decision to run in the election.

[Szczepula] Would that be a disaster?

[Korwin-Mikke] Of course, because it could happen that the Right's votes will become fragmented, and then both Mr. Walesa and Mr. Oleksy will enter the second round of the election. And then Mr. Oleksy will be certain to win.

[Szczepula] So, will the whole camp representing the former democratic opposition mobilize itself and nominate their own candidate?

[Korwin-Mikke] Let us not believe in mirages. But I can tell you that UPR does have a candidate—a man from outside all of the present political configurations—who is certain to win once he agrees to run in the election.

[Szczepula] Who is that?

[Korwin-Mikke] It is too early for me to tell you.

[Szczepula] Is he a well-known figure?

[Korwin-Mikke] Yes, of course.

[Szczepula] Thank you for talking to us.

## UW Official on Ties to Region's Liberals

*PM1306142594 Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 6 Jun 94 p 2*

[Interview with Jan Maria Rokita, chairman of the Union of Freedom's Krakow regional branch, by correspondent "Jam"; place and date not given]

[Text] [CZAS KRAKOWSKI] Does the result of the election of the Union of Freedom chairman not indicate that two parallel but counteropposed orientations exist within the Union of Freedom's [UW] Krakow regional organization?

[Rokita] It is certainly a clear indication that the efforts and arguments I brought to the task of shaping the Democratic Union over the past two years, on both the national scene and here in Krakow, have somewhat eroded my authority. However, I believe that a politician's authority is not something to cultivate artificially but something to engage—even at a risk—in fighting for just causes. My determined involvement in the campaign to achieve a coalition with the Liberals, then in the unification process and then in the effort to rid that party of its openly anticlerical and prosocialist tendencies, has naturally impaired my authority to a certain extent. Given these circumstances, I view the result of the election as my own personal success.

[CZAS KRAKOWSKI] The Krakow Liberals do not appear to be particularly pleased with the course and outcome of the unification campaign. Does this not pose a special, rather delicate problem for the UW regional chairman?

[Rokita] It certainly creates a need for an honest, thorough discussion with the activists from the former Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD] structures. We recently had some differences connected with the postulated composition of the election list to be prepared by our new, joint coalition. I will not deny that I made some considerable concessions for the Liberals. I take full personal responsibility for these concessions, as I made

them against considerable pressure from certain structures hailing from the former Democratic Union [UD]. This was not an easy thing to do because many UD members still remember the KLD's inauspicious beginnings in Krakow at the time that party was still a marginal group set up by local anarchists. However, that part of their past is now behind us, especially because the present leadership of the Krakow KLD organization had nothing to do with that episode. I trust we will be able to resolve certain questions hinging on personal ambitions. In any case, I do not predict any serious or lasting conflict based on these minor difficulties.

[CZAS KRAKOWSKI] On the other hand, a much more serious conflict, in which you are involved, arose at the central level of your new party structures. You clashed quite sharply with Sejm Deputy Barbara Labuda. How do you propose to resolve this problem?

[Rokita] I cannot yet specify the detailed procedure by which our conflict will be resolved, but I can already say that I have no doubt that, given her record in the parliamentary vote on the budget and the preparation of the new constitution, and considering her fanatical attacks against the Catholic Church and her part in the abortion debate, it is only a question of time before Barbara Labuda leaves the UW parliamentary caucus and, indeed, the party as such. However, the difficulty here is that her temperament does not allow her to leave the party of her own will, despite the open conflict and contentious argument she has with almost the entire party on almost all of the possible issues. But there is no question that a solution to this problem will have to be found.

## Report on Foreign Investments in Poland

*94EP0064A Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 20, 15 May 94 p 23*

[Article by E.M.: "Who Invests in Poland and How?"]

[Text] Toward the end of 1992, the number of joint ventures registered in Poland exceeded 10,000. Of this total, 5,740 provided financial reports, meaning that they actually operated. In reality, however, that number was higher because companies with fewer than five employees are exempt from the duty of reporting. The sum total of the capital invested amounted to $1.4 billion, compared with $490 million toward the end of 1991.

The foreign investors are led by the Americans, who invested altogether $933 million by the end of 1992, mostly in the form of large investments averaging $23 million per company, as compared with an average of $246,000 per company for foreign investments as a whole. Next to the Americans were Italian investors ($270 million total), followed by transnational corporations and international financial institutions, and, last, by investors from Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and Belgium.

The Italians led in boldness of investment projects—their investment plans envisage an additional $1 billion. The Americans, too, plan to invest about $1 billion. Eighty percent of all foreign investments in Poland derive from the 10 countries named above. Noteworthy is the unusually low level of investment by Japanese companies in Poland.

In the subsector structure of foreign investments, industrial enterprises rank foremost, accounting for 64 percent of all capital invested; they were followed by trade (17 percent), transportation (3.7 percent), and construction (3.2 percent). In 1992, the proportion of foreign investments in transportation and construction decreased, but in trade it increased. Approximately $400 million in foreign capital has been invested in the electrical-machinery industry.

As in the case of the countries of origin of capital investment, the geographical distribution of investment sites is markedly uneven. Most investments are concentrated in seven or eight voivodships, chiefly in the Warsaw (30 percent), Poznan, Gdansk, Szczecin, Katowice, Koszalin, and Torun voivodships. In comparison, the proportion of investments in such [eastern] voivodships as Tarnobrzeg, Chelm, Zamosc, Przemysl, Krosno, and many others was negligible.

Such are some of the data provided in the fourth regular report of the Institute for Business Cycles and Foreign Trade Prices (IKC), authored by Dr. J. Biskup and Dr. W. Burzynski. According to them, that report deals with only some aspects of the situation in 1993 owing to the absence of the data needed for a comprehensive analysis of the operations of joint ventures. Such an analysis will be presented in the next report, to be published this coming summer. In comparison with its previous issues, the report presented does, however, contain some new elements. It is a compendium of data on all of the major foreign companies operating in Poland and, in its final part, presents figures on the growth of direct foreign investments in the world and their role in the world economy. This serves to evaluate the significance of foreign capital to the growth of the Polish economy against a broader background.

The IKC report discusses in some detail the laws governing foreign investments and specifies the legal acts concerned, which can be of practical importance to potential investors. It also contains many specific data on the operations and financial status of companies. The aggregate value of the projects launched by joint ventures amounted to somewhat more than 4 trillion zlotys [Z]. Investments worth more than Z20 billion each were undertaken by 53 companies,those worth Z10-20 billion each by 43 companies, and those of less than Z500 million by 792 companies. As much as 79 percent of the companies engaged in no investment projects at all. Joint ventures contracted in 1992 bank loans totaling Z21.6 trillion, or nearly four times as much as in 1991. Of that total, more than half were in the form of foreign credits. The overall sales volume of these companies exceeded

Z145 trillion, with the domestic market accounting for most (72 percent) of the sales. Exports accounted for 26 percent. Industrial enterprises handled 70 percent of the sales of their own products and services, followed by construction enterprises, with 6.4 percent, and transportation and trading enterprises, with 4.4. percent.

In 1992, joint ventures employed altogether 230,000 people—i.e., about 2 percent of total employment in Poland. A year previously they had employed fewer than 120,000 people.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs considered 1,126 requests from foreigners for the purchase of real estate, of which it approved 876 (including 518 requests from physical persons) and declined 112. In Warsaw Voivodship, 64 hectares of land were sold to foreigners, in Szczecin Voivodship 39, in Poznan Voivodship 29, in Tarnow Voivodship 19, in the Nowy Sad and Zielona Gora voivodships 18 each, in Opole Voivodship 15, and in the Wroclaw and Katowice voivodships 11 each.

Particularly interesting aspects of the report concern the findings of studies of the incentives and disincentives for foreign companies as regards investing in Poland. The biggest incentive for investing is the prospects for economic growth and the size of the market. Another consideration is the agreements concluded by Poland concerning the establishment of free-trade zones. On the other hand, foreign investors ascribed relatively little importance to the evolving political situation in this country. (However, following the recent elections [in which the postcommunists won] and in view of the ongoing political donnybrook, this may change.)

It turns out that bureaucratic barriers are probably the strongest disincentive for investing in our country. Civil servants often simply shy away from making final decisions. In addition, the quality of our managerial personnel elicits doubt. Other negative considerations include the underdevelopment of the economic infrastructure, the frequent revisions of the tax system, and the fatal—in the eyes of foreign entrepreneurs—tariff policy.

### PNTCD Plans Impeachment Proceedings

*AU1006203494 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] At a meeting held today, the Leadership, Coordination, and Control Bureau of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD] reached the conclusion that Romanian President Ion Iliescu has infringed upon the independence of the legal system in the statements he has made during his visits through the country by trying to influence judges in certain cases awaiting trial and by urging the ignoring of judge's final decisions, a communique received by ROMPRES reads. In conclusion, the aforementioned communique points out that in view of the fact that the head of state has exceeded his prerogatives through such statements and has seriously obstructed the perquisites of the judicial power, the PNTCD Leadership, Coordination, and Control Bureau has decided to open impeachment proceedings against Romania's president, through its parliamentary representatives, in accordance with Article 95 of the Constitution.

Referring to the communique issued by the PNTCD Leadership, Coordination, and Control Bureau on 10 June, Presidency Spokesman Ambassador Traian Chebeleu made the following statement, the contents of which we are presenting in full:

I consider the communique of the PNTCD Leadership Bureau as an inadmissible offensive against the president coming from a parliamentary political party. This is a regrettable act, even embarrassing for its authors. The communique's allegations are most serious and devoid of any factual foundation. I do not know when or how Romania's president might have infringed upon the independence of the legal bodies. This is an unfounded accusation that I categorically refute. It is possible that, in its combat program against the country's freely elected president, the PNTCD has run out of all arguments and is now inventing something to artificially provoke tensions and divert the attention of the country's political forces and the parliament from the real problems that have to be solved now. This is painful and, I repeat, embarrassing for the authors of this initiative.

So concludes the statement of the presidency's spokesman regarding the communique of the PNTCD Leadership Bureau released today, 10 June 1994, by the ROMPRES agency.

### Spokesman Rejects 'Ethic Autonomy' Term

*AU1006133194 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Relations between Romania and Hungary do not need mediators to be settled, Romanian Presidency Spokesman Traian Chebeleu said today at his weekly news conference, referring to certain commentaries that have appeared following the telegram that Gyula Horn, president of the Hungarian Socialist Party, sent to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania.

Chebeleu said that numerous terms without precise content are being circulated, such as the term autonomy for minorities, and if this term refers to ethnic autonomy, this means quote, dynamite for the state unity of Romania, unquote, and is against European principles.

Referring to certain statements by Ioan Alexandru, PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party] senator, Ambassador Chebeleu said that one cannot talk about a discriminatory attitude adopted by Germany in connection with Romania joining European institutions.

### Council Protests Moldovan Decision on Anthem

*AU1106171894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Text] The National Council for Reunification has expressed its indignation over the replacement of the state anthem of the Republic of Moldova, as decided by the Chisinau parliament. In a communique sent today to the ROMPRES news agency, that council assesses that the decision to make such an alteration sanctions, quote, the delusion perpetrated by leaders who call themselves Moldovans and the legitimizing of neocommunist, anti-union, and anti-Romanian forces, unquote. The document also accuses the campaign of depriving the Moldovan people of their national identity and progressively sovietizing territories stolen from Romania, from the inside.

## Izetbegovic Threatens To Mobilize Muslim Nations

*LD1106212894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 11 Jun 94*

["Complete" news conference by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic with unidentified correspondents in Sarajevo on 11 June—recorded]

[Text] [Izetbegovic] The main motive for my tour was to see army commanders at a military base in central Bosnia. I saw all corps commanders, except, of course, Army Brigadier Dudakovic, who is in Bihac [words indistinct] their military situation. There are two possible developments: that there is a cease-fire [words indistinct] in Geneva; and that there is no cease-fire. We discussed both possibilities, and we are ready to face both possibilities. I can say that I am glad and satisfied that we were ready for the continuation of fighting and for the cessation of fighting—temporary, as it was concluded.

This lull could be very handy both for the Serbs and for us. We will use this lull to prepare ourselves for any possibility. We are not sure that Karadzic's Serbs are ready for a just peace. I think that at the moment there are no signs of them being ready for it. So, I am not a great optimist, although I really hope that we will restore peace, to avoid further bloodshed and suffering. I must admit that I am not optimistic that there will be peace. But, miracles have happened. This would be a miracle, but our army will be ready not only to defend, but also to gradually liberate land.

[Question indistinct on lifting of arms embargo]

[Izetbegovic] Yes, a lot of attention has focused on that issue and with good reason—especially (?in principle). It only remains for us to see what this will mean in practical terms. It will be very difficult to implement such a thing, and we are aware of that. We analyzed how it could be possible that, for example, American weapons really could arrive in Bosnia one day. There are many difficulties—of a procedural nature and of a technical nature. Of course, the difficulties are mainly of a procedural nature because I do not think that America will go for a unilateral lifting of the embargo. Therefore, they will probably have to go through the UN Security Council, where they will have to encounter Russia, Great Britain and so on—great enemies of the lifting of the embargo. It is possible that a repeated vote could result in a binding decision, but I think that in that case there would be different difficulties on the Russia-America line. There will certainly be many difficulties and our people should not take this for granted.

However, despite all that, this decision is of great importance. Above all, it is a major political victory for us, and also—if this is of any importance at all—a victory for a certain principle of justice, that is, the right to self-defense. In practical terms, the importance of the decision will be—if not in the direct supply of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina—that it will be possible to use the decision as leverage for achieving other things. I think that in this respect the decision will be very important. For example, the decision could be leverage which could provide, not for the supply of arms to the Bosnian Army, but for the impounding of the arms from the other, aggressor's army. This is a proposal which we have been upholding for a long time, and which is known as our theory of balance. The problem of arms here is in fact not whether we will be given weapons. The problem is in establishing balance.

We have had a complete imbalance in armaments for three years. I say three years because it is just coming to three years since the war began. People forget that it did not begin two, but three years ago with a campaign in Slovenia; then it was continued in Croatia and so on. Silajdzic said again yesterday that a medicine which had not worked for three years must be the wrong one.

They stubbornly continue saying that the medicine [words indistinct]. The embargo retains an imbalance in armaments and encourages (?the other side), due to its technical superiority, not to be interested in joining serious negotiations. Therefore there are no serious negotiations, and consequently no peace. We say: Alright, let us take a different approach. Take the arms from them, so that there is a balance in armaments and serious negotiations and, ultimately, peace.

Therefore, this decision by the American Congress could have an impact on adopting this second approach—to impound the arms from the aggressor's army. After all, such a proposal is included in UN Security Council Resolution [number indistinct]. The only problem is implementing it.

I said this recently in talks with American senators. I will use this opportunity to explain that idea of mine because it has been misinterpreted. I said—as we have succeeded in establishing a 20-kilometer zone without Serbian arms in Sarajevo—we could have a zone of 200 kilometers, that is, 100-km in radius with a center on some other location in Bosnia, such as Zenica [words indistinct]. Bosnia would be completely covered. In that zone the aggressor's side would be ordered to withdraw its weapons and threatened with air strikes if it fails to comply.

This does not require the deployment of soldiers, which has met with wide-spread feeling of opposition in the West anyway. We are not asking for that, but it would be very effective [words indistinct] and lead to peace. Finally, with the help of this decision, there are ways of preventing Serbia and Montenegro from further supplying the aggressor's army in Bosnia-Herzegovina with weapons. Our diplomacy is working on all that.

[Question indistinct]

[Izetbegovic] It gains in importance every day. First of all, Islamic countries are not great military powers, but they have now become involved in this conflict because

they have sent soldiers to join UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces]. But their main role has been in providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course, primarily political assistance and support, moral support. That is not unimportant and it should not be underestimated, although it does not yield material results immediately. The Islamic countries have also provided great humanitarian aid.

However, there is one weapon which we have not used yet and we will probably use it. The awareness of the following is growing in Islamic countries: Bosnia is becoming a test of the West's attitude towards Islamic countries. No Western country which fails to display a fair stance in this critical phase of the Bosnian crisis—either in respect of the continuation of the war or a just peace—no Western country can count on the friendship of Muslim countries and Muslim nations. On the other hand, I believe that Muslim countries and Muslim nations will consider as hostile any Western country which in these circumstances fails to adopt a fair stance on the Bosnian crisis. Not only because what is at issue here is the defense of democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but because this is primarily an attempt to destroy the Muslim people here. This is clear to Islamic countries.

I will personally do everything I can [words indistinct] use all my influence to make every Muslim and every Muslim leader, every nation, realize that what is going on here is the war against Muslim people. Therefore, they should make it clear to the governments in the West, they should tell them: We will act towards you in the same way you act in this crucial phase of the denouement in Bosnia.

[Question indistinct]

[Izetbegovic] Yes, I had the opportunity to be a witness of that difficult haggling in Geneva. I was happy when I heard the outcome, and I saw it as a great diplomatic victory for us. I would also like to congratulate our delegation, headed by Mr. Ejup Ganic.

First of all, we managed to rid Gorazde of chetniks, owing to our perseverance and our refusal to negotiate before they withdraw. That is a big achievement because they had no intention of leaving the area. We have correspondence proving that those on the right bank of the river Drina claimed they would never leave. They were forced to withdraw.

That is one thing, and the other thing is that, as you know, our attitude to this issue was respected. There were two basic issues we defended in Geneva: The cease-fire can be temporary, not four months, but four weeks long. That was accepted. The second issue was that there should be no deployment of UN protection forces between the lines, which would freeze the lines. We said that we would do everything and take good care not to freeze the lines. As you know, that has not happened. The Serbs had to accept only routine control by UN forces, no deployment. We all know what the deployment of UNPROFOR between us and them could mean—a final political solution. As you can see, we did not make this mistake, and I think that this round of talks [sentence ends; after a few seconds of silence, station carries music]

## Plavsic Criticizes FRY President's Speech

*AU1006195394 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 9 Jun 94 p 2*

[Report by M. Maric: "Biljana Plavsic—He Who Attacks the National Interests Will Inevitably Lose"]

[Text] Banja Luka—In a statement for GLAS SRPSKI, Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the republic of Srpska, among other things, touched upon the speech FRY President Zoran Lilic made at the congress of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation in Novi Sad the day before yesterday.

"Statements made by some SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] officials or by some people belonging to the SPS, in which they advocate the need to give in to blackmail in the peace process are suddenly along the same line as the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] (perhaps one should not say suddenly, because similar things have been happening for a long time whenever the national question is discussed and when Serbs in Krajina and the republic of Srpska are concerned). In this respect, they do not differ from Vuk Draskovic who had said: 'Send them there, let them live together with the Muslims.' And when Zoran Lilic says 'we no longer want to be hostages to the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina,' he is only putting it a little differently.

"Democracy suits the Serbian people, and I do not know how, with such views, it could endure the 50-year torture of an undemocratic regime. The Serbian people have a rich history and that helps it to survive on this Balkan wasteland. Therefore, all those people who attack the basic national interests will inevitably lose. Such changes will happen in Serbia as well, although everything is happening a little more slowly there. Things were happening in this way here, because we were thrown into events that occurred quickly and into dangerous situations. However, I am convinced that this will happen in Serbia as well," Biljana Plavsic concluded.

## Krajisnik Denies 'Rift' With Serbia

*LD1106001794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2311 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Belgrade, June 10 (TANJUG)—President of the national assembly of the Bosnian Serb republic Momcilo Krajisnik said on Friday that "there is no rift between the Serb republic and Serbia, no-one shall cast a doubt on the harmony and determination of the Serb people and the justified objective—life in one state, will be realized."

Commenting the many speculations in the public about a cooling in relations between Belgrade and Pale, Krajisnik said "we perhaps have different views on many

things, but this cannot be described as cooling in any way." The speculations on a cooling of relations were triggered by a statement on Tuesday by Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic who said that Yugoslav citizens cannot be hostages of any leader from the territory of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia [as received], the Serb republic, or the republic of Serb Krajina in former Croatia.

Pointing out that the two-year war of Moslems, Serbs and Croats in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina "has to end," Lilic said at the time when ceasefire negotiations between the warring sides were underway in Geneva that the Yugoslav people "rightly expect the peace talks to succeed and cannot agree to the option that they are infinitely prolonged and undermined."

In a statement to the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA, Krajisnik said that Lilic's statement "is not sufficiently defined and precise, and has therefore created confusion, but it cannot pertain to the Serb people in the Serb republic or in the republic of Serb Krajina."

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a federation of Serbia and Montenegro, is under comprehensive and binding sanctions which were imposed in May 1992 by the United Nations Security Council because of its alleged involvement in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. [word indistinct] sanctions present a big problem and we are all engaged in the utmost towards their lifting, and different views should not be taken to mean a rift," Krajisnik said, adding that he his experience with Belgrade was positive. "In the contacts so far, Lilic has shown a special devotion to the Serb national issue and we hope he will elucidate on the stand he recently voiced," Krajisnik concluded.

Special U.N. envoy for former Yugoslavia Yasushi Akashi and representatives of Bosnian Serbs and the Moslem-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an agreement on a one-month cessation of mostilities in Geneva on Wednesday. Akashi had proposed a four-month ceasefire, and the Serb Republic was for a lasting agreement, but it adopted the Japanese diplomat's proposal. The Moslem-Croat delegation, however, agreed four-weeks as the longest possible period for a ceasefire.

### Karadzic Comments on Statement

*AU1006153694 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 94 p 1*

["D. K."-initialed report: "Karadzic: We Do Not Wish Anyone To Be Our Hostage"]

[Text] Banja Luka 9 June—In light of the statement by [FRY President] Zoran Lilic that the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be the hostages of the political leaders from the republic of Srpska, the republic of Serbian Krajina, or the FRY, Radovan Karadzic in a statement for JAVNOST emphasized:

"We do not believe that President Lilic referred to us when he spoke about sabotage of the negotiations. As regards Yugoslavia distancing itself from this problem, we have always favored something of the kind. We do not wish anyone to be our hostage, however, we will, by the same token, not accept the fate of Mica Ljubibratic, the leader of the Herzegovina uprising, or the outcome of the Berlin Congress."

"Therefore, we do not accept any custody over us. We have created our own state and our aim is to unite with Serbia into one state. If this is not possible, then with Yugoslavia as a federation, and if even this is not possible, then we will remain an independent state until the unification with our mother country is facilitated for us."

### Karadzic on Talks, U.S. Lifting Arms Embargo

*LD1006185794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1714 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Pale, 10 Jun (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic said at a news conference in Pale today that the Serbian side made the maximum effort to save the latest peace talks in Geneva. The Muslim side was successfully torpedoing the talks all the time. They began by setting nonsensical preconditions concerning Gorazde, and when even the minutest details were ironed out, they proposed the signing of some kind of four-week cease-fire, Karadzic said.

"We could have refused, but we wished to give the conference a chance and we finally accepted Akashi's proposal for a month-long truce," Karadzic added. He assessed that the world media finally realized after the Geneva gathering that the Serbian side is for peace, while it became clear to everyone that the Muslim side is for war. Karadzic also said that the Geneva agreement is not at the level of a cease-fire, but that it carries certain weight nevertheless, primarily applying to POW swaps, which is an element of a cessation of hostilities. We have succeeded in this respect, because our opponents promised to carry out the exchange.

Commenting on the vote in the U.S. House of Representatives with regard to lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia's Muslims, Karadzic said that this decision is not legally binding. "I do not know how this decision could be translated into practice when the embargo itself does not exist. The Muslims are receiving arms on a daily basis. This could help certain countries unilaterally lift their embargo against us," he said.

The republic of Srpska president recalled that Clinton could use his power of veto, and that this decision is a form of pressure aimed at effecting the acceptance of a new peace plan. "I believe that a new map is being prepared, a map unacceptable to us, and partly acceptable to the Muslims. That is why we should establish cooperation with the international community as soon as

possible and take part in drawing up these maps, so we can tell them precisely what is and what is not acceptable," Karadzic said.

Commenting on hints that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might be lifted, Karadzic said that this is an attempt to create the illusion of America's impartiality. The sanctions should nevertheless be lifted, regardless of the outcome of the talks on Bosnia, because these sanctions are affecting a country that is not at war.

Speaking about the latest cease-fire which came into effect at noon today, the republic of Srpska president said that the republic of Srpska would now assume a position of passive defense. However, if the Muslims fail to honor the cease-fire, we will turn this into active defense, so they risk losing everything, Radovan Karadzic concluded.

### Krajisnik: Muslims Will Not Agree to Peace

*LD1206145494 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1427 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Text] Novi Sad, June 12 (TANJUG)—President of the parliament of the Bosnian Serb republic (R.S.) Momcilo Krajisnik, with reference to the latest one-month cease-fire signed in Geneva, has stated that the Muslims will not agree to any peace irrespective of its limited length. Krajisnik said this in an interview to be published in Monday's DNEVNIK daily of Novi Sad. He added that perhaps it was better that a short-range truce was signed in Geneva.

"Had they accepted the Serb proposal on a year-long cessation of hostilities," said he, "they would have presented themselves to the world as the fighters for peace, but, essentially, they do not give up their offensive actions against Serb territories."

Geneva talks on the overall cessation of hostilities in Bosnia ended on June 7 in signinig a statement on a one-month cessation of combat activities, based on the Muslim-Croat proposal. In commenting on a territorial division map drawn by the "contact group" in Geneva, Krajisnik said that this had concerned the fulfilment of the megalomaniac demands by Croats and Muslims to be given nearly the entire western Bosnia and good parts of northern and eastern Bosnia.

"Of course, it is out of the question that we shall agree to give the places where genocide of Serb people was committed in the past two wars," said Krajisnik.

### Mladic on Tolerating Muslim, Croat Attacks

*LD1206212094 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2008 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Text] Sarajevo, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Colonel General Ratko Mladic, chief of staff of the army of the republic of Srpska, tonight told Serb Radio's Sarajevo Studio that Muslim and Croat forces again failed today to comply with the cease-fire on Bosnia-Herzegovina's front lines. The heaviest attacks on the republic of Srpska were launched in the Brcko area. There were also enemy provocations on other front lines, Mladic said.

"We are going to continue our full compliance with what we agreed to in Geneva, i.e. to refrain from offensive operations and we are going to tolerate their attacks as long as they are not a serious threat to the republic of Srpska and the Serbian people," the chief of staff of the army of the republic of Srpska said. He also said that the army of the republic of Srpska "will not allow enemy forces to enjoy their leisure."

"We are following all their efforts to consolidate their ranks within this month of cease-fire and to arm themselves and prepare offensive operations, something they hinted at even before their arrival in Geneva," General Mladic said.

### UN Spokesman Details Brcko Truce Violation

*AU1206195294 Paris AFP in English 1932 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, June 12 (AFP)—Rockets slammed into the northern Serb-held town of Brcko on Sunday [12 June], but Bosnia's fragile two-day-old truce was otherwise holding, a UN spokesman said. Five or six rockets from an unknown source fell at midday in the first truce violation at Brcko since the UN-brokered ceasefire came into effect on Friday, Commander Eric Chaperon said.

"However, the overall situation remains calm, with a slightly higher level of activity than in the morning," he said in mid-afternoon. [passage omitted] Chaperon said earlier he did not know where the shells had been fired from.

Brcko commands a narrow strip of land across northern Bosnia-Herzegovina that forms a crucial supply line for Serbs between their stronghold of Banja Luka in the west and Serbia to the east. The area, known as the Posavina corridor, has seen a build-up by both Bosnian army and separatist Serb forces in the past two months.

Chaperon said UN troops recorded 11 detonations at the northeastern town of Srebrenik, a few detonations at Dastansko, in central Bosnia, and 16 mortar rounds at Ribnica, a Bosnian army position in the north of the republic. A UN patrol at Gorazde in eastern Bosnia "came under light arms fire from Bosnian Serb forces," Chaperon added.

In the northwestern Moslem pocket of Bihac, the situation was calm Sunday after attacks a day earlier by Bosnian army forces in which they recovered territory captured by secessionists loyal to maverick Moslem leader Fikret Abdic, Chaperon said. [passage omitted]

### UN Confirms Croatian 'Offensive'

*LD1306102094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0922 GMT 13 Jun 94*

[Text] Belgrade, June 13 (TANJUG)—UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] representative in Sarajevo confirmed Sunday night [12 June] that the forces of Bosnian Croats launched an offensive against the Serbs in Bosnia in the north of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the UPI news agency reported, he specified that at least five projectiles were fired from multiple rocket launchers Sunday on Brcko, a Serb town in northern Bosnia.

This action by Bosnian Croats surprised the U.N., said the UNPROFOR representative. According to the Bosnian Serbs' military sources, five civilians, including a child and a Serb soldier, were wounded when from the territory of neighboring Croatia 8 projectiles were fired from the multiple rocket launchers on civilian targets in Brcko.

This was the eighth artillery attack on Brcko over the past month, and the fifth from the territory controlled by the forcibly seceded former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia. The attacks killed a total of seven and wounded 46 people either on the street or at home.

The attack on Brcko came in spite a four-week ceasefire, concluded last Wednesday in Geneva, which came into force on Friday at noon between the Moslem-Croatian federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb republic (R.S.).

### Further on Shelling From Croatia

*LD1206155394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1553 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Excerpts] Brcko, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Ivan Todorovic (62) was wounded in an artillery attack on Brcko today, the press center in Brcko has reported. According to Serb military sources, eight 128 mm multiple-rocket launcher missiles were fired at 1202 today from positions in Rajevo Selo on the left bank of the Sava, from the territory of the Republic of Croatia. [passage omitted] Initial reports suggested that the attack was launched from Vucilovac, but republic of Srpska army observers determined that the missiles were fired from the nearby Rajevo Selo in the Republic of Croatia. [passage omitted]

### Six Wounded in Shelling

*LD1206192394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1914 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Excerpts] Brcko, June 12 (TANJUG)—Six people were wounded in an artillery shelling of the Serb town of Brcko in northeastern Bosnia on Sunday, the town's press centre said in the evening. [passage omitted] The enemy was again shelling civilan targets, mostly residential buildings, inflicting extensive damage, and only rain, which has forced most people off the streets, kept the number of casualties as low as it was. This was the eighth artillery shelling of Brcko in the last month, and fifth from the direction of Croatia. A total of seven people were killed and 46 others were wounded in the attacks. The local U.N. observer team has duly informed the Tuzla-based command of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for northeastern Bosnia and the UNPROFOR command in Sarajevo of each incident, lodging protests.

### Fierce Inter-Muslim Fighting Reported in West

*LD1206121994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1118 GMT 12 Jun 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Petrovac, June 12 (TANJUG)—Fierce inter-Moslem clashes continued on Sunday morning [12 June] in the autonomous provice of western Bosnia (APWB), local Moslem media reported. Radio Velkaton in Velika Kladusa, the APWB administrative centre, reported that apwb military and civilian targets along the entire fromtline were continuously attacked by moslem forces loyal to the Sarajevo-based central Moslem authorities headed by fundamentalist leader Alija Izetbegovic. The radio reported losses on both sides, but did not specify whether the frontline was moved.

Izetbegovic's Radio Cazin and Radio Sarajevo reported fiercest clashes at Pecigrad and Todorov where Izetbegovic's forces strongly attack the APWB forces which were trying hard to defend themselves. Izetbegovic's media added that an APWB brigade changed sides and took hold of several hamlets around Todorovo in the past 24 hours, moving considerably the frontline.

World news agencies, however, quoted Eric Chaperon, UNPROFOR (U.N. Protection Force) spokesman in Sarajevo, as stating that the APWB forces made an advance in the attack they began on Friday. Chaperon said that the Izetbegovic forces were suppressed from the line of contact in acute attacks which used heavy artillery and mortars, with losses indicated to have been suffered by both sides.

Major Yvon Desjardins, UNPROFOR spokesman in Zagreb, specified that heavy fighting continued on Sunday morning in the central and western sections of the Bihac pocket in the APWB territory, whence reports came about APWB leader Fikret Abdic forces' opening artillery and tank-gun fire. Maj. Desjardins, however, could not immediately confirm the reports that Izetbegovic's forces had lost some of their territories.

Fikret Abdic, the opponent of the war option backed by Alija Izetbegovic, last autumn proclaimed the APWB (Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia) and immediately agreed a truce with Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

### Abdic Forces Continue Attacks

*AU1306110394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 13 Jun 94*

[Report by Mirza Sadikovic from Bihac]

[Excerpts] Early this morning Mayor Mirsad Crnkic, commander of the 511th Glorious Bosanska Krupa Brigade, died after being shot [words indistinct] on the front line by a maverick bullet from the positions of Abdic's rebels and traitors. [passage omitted]

Since early this morning the members of Abdic's rebel paramilitary have been shelling the areas of Pecigrad, Skokovi, Todorovo, Golubovici, (Pljanici), and (Krivaja). They have attempted several infantry breakthroughs, thus proving that their warmongers are not giving up on further conflicts regardless of the means and human cost. Since yesterday they have destroyed dozens of houses and inflicted several casualties. This is why they obviously do not want to carry out the agreed exchange of the bodies of killed soldiers.

Karadzic's chetniks have been abundantly helping out the Kladusa paramilitary as they have been firing with antiaircraft weapons and small arms throughout the night and this morning on the (Bihac) and Bosanska Krupa fronts. They have also intensified their activities on the Grmusko-Srbljanski Plateau. Our defenders have not been responding to these attacks in compliance with the arranged cease-fire.

### UNPROFOR: Serbs Attack British Patrol

*AU1306113994 Paris AFP in English 1113 GMT 13 Jun 94*

[By Helene Despic-Popovic]

[Excerpts] Sarajevo, 13 (AFP)—Bosnian Serbs attacked a British UN patrol in northern Bosnia, UN officials said Monday [13 June], in the latest violation of a three-day-old ceasefire aimed at breaking the cycle of violence in Bosnia. But while also reporting other clashes, a UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] spokesman insisted that the ceasefire had generally held since coming into force Friday [10 June]. The truce signed in Geneva last week was intended to make time for talks on an overall settlement.

"Conflict continued to decrease substantially over the past two days indicating continuing compliance with at least the spirit of cessation-of-hostilities agreement," UNPROFOR spokesman Eric Chaperon said. The British UNPROFOR patrol, comprising two Warrior armoured troop carriers, fired back after being targetted by 15-20 mortar shells and several bursts of machine gun fire Sunday evening, Chaperon said.

"The Warriors were clearly showing the UN flag, therefore it was a deliberate attack against UNPROFOR," said a UN Protection Force report issued in Kiseljak, northern Bosnia. The incident happened on a Moslem-Serb frontline north of Maglaj, near the village of Halilovici, it said.

Chaperon said 30 machine gun bullets hit the armoured vehicle, but there were no casualties. The British UN forces responded by firing 80 7.62 mm shots before withdrawing a short distance. The patrol was targetted again about two hours later by about 20 mortar shells, Chaperon continued. Ten of them landed some 10 metres (yards) of the Warriors. Following the second attack the patrol withdrew to Halilovici, Chaperon said, adding that on both occasions the shots were fired from Serb positions. He added that UNPROFOR commanders on the ground did not request air support from North Atlantic Treaty Organization planes. The British patrol was in a new zone, which could have surprised the Serbs, he added. [passage omitted]

In a separate development, a Jordanian UN soldier was injured Sunday in a mine explosion in southern Croatia, a UNPROFOR spokesman said in the Croatia capital Zagreb. The officer lost a foot in the incident, which happened on a road on the front line between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, the spokesman said, quoted by the HINA news agency. It said the road in question had been cleared and demined by the Jordanian UN battalion in the region during the day.

### Rose Sees Truce as Beginning of End of War

*LD1006211794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1746 GMT 10 Jun 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, June 10 (TANJUG)—British General Sir Michael Rose, commander of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina, assessed an overall one-month truce in Bosnia, which took effect on Friday noon (1000 GMT), as 'the beginning of the end of the war.' Gen. Rose told the press in Sarajevo that thousands of peacekeepers would be deployed throughout Bosnia to monitor the four-week truce signed by representatives of warring sides in Geneva on Wednesday. Gen. Rose warned that a U.S. Congressional vote to unilaterally lift an arms embargo on Bosnian moslems, passed on Thursday, could undermine peace efforts. 'I hope it does not raise false hope in people's minds. You know it has been an aspiration of the Bosnian Government. Their view that "give us the weapons and we'll finish the job" is fairly widespread, but my own view is that it takes a lot more than just being given equipment to win a war.'

The U.N. Security Council in the Autumn of 1991 introduced an arms embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an effort to contribute to settling ethnic conflicts there. The Bosnian Moslems, strongly supported by Islamic countries, have for months called for their exemption from the arms embargo.

UNPROFOR spokesman Eric Chaperon also on Friday in Sarajevo said that the intensity of fighting in Bosnia has not been on such a low level for over a year, as it was a few hours before the ceasefire took effect. Sporadic artillery fire was reported in northern and central Bosnia, but the intensity was half as strong as the previous day, Chaperon said.

According to U.N. monitors reporting, there were only 80 artillery shells fired on Friday on the frontline between Gradacac and Ribnica in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, while the previous day 389 shells were fired in the same area.

## SPS Expects To Be 'Political Factor' in Region

*AU1206201094 Novi Sad TVNS Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 12 Jun 94*

[Report by Milorad Vukasinovic from Banja Luka—recorded]

[Text] The formation of the Socialist Party of Serbia in the republic of Srpska does not mean the beginning of disunity but reflects peoples' need for the activity of a political party that favors the creation of a humane and democratic society on these territories, it was stated at the gathering of the Young Socialists in Banja Luka today.

Greeting all present in the name of the large delegation of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], Federal Human Rights Minister Margit Savovic expressed the belief that the left wing in the republic of Srpska holds the future. It was emphasized that freedom, just peace, and the right to self-determination for the Serbian people are the fundamental program goals of this party which expects to become a significant political factor in the republic of Srpska in the coming period.

[Dragan Ilic, president of the SPS in the republic of Srpska] The socialist ideal and the ideal of social justice has existed among these people for eons. Therefore, a political organization that embraces this idea, manifests it further politically, and places it at the service of the nation, had to appear.

[Sasa Cudic, president of the Alliance of the Young Socialists in the republic of Srpska] Above all I would emphasize that the strengthening of the SPS in the republic of Srpska has resulted in the strengthening of its progeny—the Young Socialists. I would emphasize that young people on the territory of our republic during the war and in bleak times that have lasted for three years have had some difficult moments trying to find perspective for their lives.

Summing up today's promotional gathering, I can single out several basic values: Just peace, freedom, democracy, and the unity of the Serbian people. [end recording]

## Muslims Confirm Readiness To Exchange POW's

*LD1206173994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1720 GMT 12 Jun 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Sarajevo, June 12 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb parliamentary Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik has stated that the Serb side has received assurances from the Moslems that they are willing to exchange all remaining POWs as agreed on Saturday [11 June]. Krajisnik made the statement on Sunday after Bosnian Serbs and Moslems had resumed talks at Sarajevo airport on prisoner exchanges.

After the first round of talks on Saturday, the two sides agreed to complete the lists of POWs held by the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] to include those captured in the recent fighting on Mt. Ozren in the north and around Gorazde in the southeast. The exchanges are to take place at Sarajevo airport, in Gorazde and at Satorovici near Brcko in northern Bosnia.

The two sides also agreed that a meeting be held on Wednesday by local representatives to exchange information about the missing. At the next round of talks on Friday, the two sides will negotiate dates for the exchanges.

An ICRC spokesman said in Geneva on Friday the organization estimated that Bosnian Moslems and Croats were holding about 450 persons prisoner and that the Serbs were holding approximately the same number of prisoners. The one-month truce which the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Moslem-Croat federation in Bosnia signed on Wednesday envisages an immediate release of all prisoners, including POWs. The truce came into effect at noon on Friday.

## Serbs Reprotedly Stop Civilians Returning Home

*AU1306111994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 13 Jun 94*

[Report by Enes Musovic from Gorazde]

[Text] This morning at 0730 some 300 citizens of (Cazagici) and (Hudjer), districts within 3 km of the Gorazde center, started off by themselves toward their properties and homes. As they said, they could no longer bear to listen to daily misinformation about the chetniks having withdrawn from their homes. They could no longer wait for someone else to solve their problems, particularly as the UN Protection Forces [UNPROFOR] has not tried to do this in the only correct way.

However, they were stopped in front of the (Cazagici) district by a group of chetniks armed with machine guns, Osa and Zolja portable rocket launchers, and hand grenades, who started to abuse and provoke them while at the same time cocking their guns. Very soon UNPROFOR positioned in Gorazde intervened with

transporters and a large number of soldiers, thus barring the citizens of (Hudjer) and (Cazagici) from reaching their homes. The situation turned very tense, but the [word indistinct] authorities prevented the unarmed people at the last moment from charging at the chetnik barrels.

It is obvious to everyone in Gorazde that the zone of three km from the city center has not been cleared, that the Serbian civilians are in fact Serb soldiers, and that they have remained in all their positions within this zone. All in all, the situation here is very tense and the likelihood of incidents and bloodshed seems to be increasing by the minute.

Victor Andreyev, chief of the UNPROFOR civilian section in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was informed about this on 7 June when he visited Gorazde. However, UNPROFOR has done nothing about it, and is still deceiving the world with tales that the Serbian soldiers, Serbian police, and Serbian civilians have left the 3-km zone from the center of Gorazde.

## Bosnian HDZ Discusses Geneva Talks

*LD1006173694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] At a session in Mostar today, the Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina is discussing the present political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Geneva talks. Zdenko Vranjes reporting:

[Vranjes] Speaking about the Geneva talks, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation and president of the Presidential Council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, said the most important thing agreed was that the question of corridors would be resolved in such a way as to give equal right to the use of corridors, i.e. to the linking of territories, to all three sides. The new proposals also contain ideas about gray zones and blue paths, i.e. the territories and paths that will be under international control until the final solution is reached.

Making the resumption of talks conditional upon the withdrawal of Serb forces from Gorazde turned out to be a good thing. They had to withdraw from Gorazde and give in and accept a one-month cease-fire—which was Croatia's proposal, said Zubak. He also said that the united Croat-Bosniak stand at the talks turned out to be successful. Zubak added that the political platform that the federation's delegation advocated in Geneva implied the survival of the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, which would be organized as a federal [slozena] state, consisting of the federation and the part presently under Serbian control. In such a federal state the constituent status of the Croatian people will be reflected both in the federation and in all the parts of the federal state. This option could be proposed by the Contact Group, together with the maps, according to the take it or leave it principle, said Zubak.

## Biographic Data of Bosniak General Muslimovic

*94BA0294A Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 21 May 94 p 11*

[Article by Dragan Marijanovic: "Who Is General Fikret Muslimovic, Appointed to the Joint Staff of the Croat Defense Council and Formations of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Officer Who Knows a Lot"]

[Text] *If he has actually decided to weave the strings of power in his hands into something that implies a lasting peace, together with Corps General Ante Ros, which he recently promised during his visit to Medjugorje, then that is good for Croats and for Bosniaks. He finally has a real opportunity to materialize unity between Croats and Bosniaks, which he has always advocated, at least verbally.*

Bosniak General Fikret Muslimovic, the main Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina officer for the Bosniak side in the recently formed Joint Staff of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the first Muslim general to visit Medjugorje since the unsuccessful and abortive meeting between Tudjman and Izetbegovic, which took place in the same location exactly one year earlier, when it turned out that despite the mediation of Owen and Stoltenberg, even in a place like Medjugorje miracles do not exactly happen every century, much less every day.

The generals who represented the two armies at that time were Slobodan Praljak for the Croats and Sefer Halilovic for the (still at that time) Muslims. Nothing came of the firm handshakes after the signing of the peace "documents" and the optimistic statements into the microphones of all the relevant world media companies. The war escalated, an unprecedented Muslim offensive in central Bosnia began, and hundreds of thousands of Croats were expelled.

At that time, former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] Lieutenant Colonel Fikret Muslimovic, with the rank of colonel in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was on that army's General Staff as the head of all intelligence and security activities. He was in a position where he was considered the person to whom even the slightest whiff of dilettantism had to be attributed at the outset. The top intelligence officer—or "security officer," as he was called at the time—acquired his skill and agility through many years of service in the notorious department led by former JNA General Vasiljevic. Muslimovic was one of the main links in this murky chain even as the storm began to brew in Slovenia, and then in Croatia. In some insider circles in Sarajevo, it was said at the time that Muslimovic could have advanced much further if he had not happened to be a Muslim, which is very likely, although like the majority of officers in the former JNA who were not of Serb nationality, he identified himself as Yugoslav.

The Serb drums of war in Bosnia forced Lt. Col. Muslimovic to opt for the just-formed Territorial Defense, an

offshoot of the Patriotic League, which was formed by people primarily of Sandzak origins. At the very outset of the war in and around Sarajevo, not in all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslimovic, under the roof of the state presidency building, assumed the duties of head of a similar political agency, attempting to apply the experience gained in organizing the disbanded army to the new conditions. To the extent that the author of this article can recall those days and the talks with the present-day Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina general in Sarajevo, he mostly preferred Croat-Muslim unity and the need to "go to the Drina together"; however, it never occurred to him to acknowledge the real contribution of the HVO to that common cause.

At the time, Muslimovic was among the people who, after the establishment of a tolerable Muslim defense in Bosnia-Herzegovina, felt that they should take the matter into their own hands and that other defense units should join them according to plans drawn up in Sarajevo, which of course did not work at all. At that time, Muslimovic's sympathies were reserved for the HOS [Croatian Defense Force], which had experienced a precipitous fall in esteem among the Croat nation. During that period, Muslimovic's main associates were certain Sandzak commanders, especially a young man nicknamed Zagi, and it is impossible to say how it is that some of the people around Muslimovic were in fact unsuccessful in defending certain parts of Sarajevo.

From the beginning, he was opposed to the creation of any Croat state community in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the mention of Herceg-Bosna this seemingly peaceful man would react in a manner that is inadvisable for such a high-ranking officer. He also selected some Croats as his associates, people who under such circumstances were deprived of any and all autonomy, which certainly comes as no surprise since the top Muslim soldier and Muslimovic's boss at the time was Sefer Halilovic, who ended the way he did. After his fall, Muslimovic advanced in the service, and he has in fact experienced his professional finale in recent days, with his appointment to the Joint Staff of the HVO and formations of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which role he has remained in Medjugorje as the head of the Bosniak military delegation, which has begun working on the more concrete implementation of the signed agreements together with a corresponding delegation from the HVO.

Gen. Muslimovic has not concealed his satisfaction with what has been achieved, and he brims over with optimism. Curiously enough, he has not mentioned a "joint advance to the Drina," although he did so before the agreements, when as part of the Muslim negotiating team he negotiated with Croat military delegations, mostly at the Sarajevo airport. What happens in the period to come will show whether this means that Gen. Muslim has finally understood the logic that the HVO is no one's mercenary army and that it exists exclusively to protect Croat interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But one thing is sure: Muslimovic is the officer in the Bosniak ranks who knows the most, and he pulled some of the strings during the Croat-Muslim fighting. If he has actually decided to weave the strings of power in his hands into something that implies a lasting peace, together with Corps General Ante Ros, which he recently promised during his visit to Medjugorje, then that is good for Croats and for Bosniaks. He finally has a real opportunity to materialize unity between Croats and Bosniaks, which he has always advocated, at least verbally. He himself will have to come face to face with the possible fragments of a troubled conscience during the war with the Croats from the one-year phase of his military career.

### War Called 'Option' in Recovering Areas

*LD1006204294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1940 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Zagreb, June 10 (TANJUG)—Zagreb will not shrink from "war option as an ultimate means" to re-establish its authority in the U.N. Protected Area (UNPA) on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, said Jure Radic, head of the presidential office of Franjo Tudjman, Friday.

"This will be done through consistent peacemaking policy", but "we do not rule out war option either as an ultimate means," Radic, secretary-general of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), told a rally in Delnice.

According to Croatian media, Radic warned that Croatia this time openly pointed out that this was the "last unproductive mandate of the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR). If the U.N. forces were not deployed on the internationally-recognized Croatian borders, the Croatian Army would," he said. "Cypriotization of Croatia is out of question" as well as the possibility of part of Croatia "becomimg some other state," Radic stressed.

The UNPA in Croatia matches the Republic of Serb Krajina (R.S.K.), which was in 1991 proclaimed by the Serbs on the territories where they are majority population, in response to Croatia's forcible secession from the former Yugoslavia and downgrading the status of the Serbs in the new state of Croatia from a constituent people to one of a natioanl minority.

Croatia does not recognize the R.S.K. and has attempted four times to forcibly return it under Zagreb's authority. The Krajina Serbs do not want to give up their independence, claiming that their state is legitinate, being created by breaking-up of the former Yugoslavia and that they, since they were a constituent people in the former state, have the right to self-determination.

Croatian President Tudjman has also on several occasions in recent months announced that Zagreb will re-establish authority in the entire territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia by force if not through negotiations.

### Serbian Socialists Favor 'Single State'

*AU1106203894 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 11 Jun 94*

[Report by Miodrag Vukadinovic from Knin]

[Text] [Begin recording] [Vukadinovic] The creation of a unified Serbian country, based on the ideas of democracy and social justice, is the basic program goal of the Serbian Party of Socialists, it was stated at the first electoral conference of this party, held in Knin. Party president Djordje Bjegovic said in his introduction that the economic and cultural reconstruction of the country parallel to the reduction of political tensions is the principle upon which Serbian Socialists will insist in their future political activities:

[Bjegovic] I believe that here I share the belief of all the citizens of the world, namely, that peace is a prerequisite in order to be able to live life. The Serbian Party of Socialists believes that peace can only be created through negotiations, cease-fire, agreements. Afterward, the issue of borders should be resolved with economic programs [sentence as heard].

[Vukadinovic] Hailing the work of the electoral conference in the name of a numerous delegation of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Federal Human Rights Minister Margit Savovic said:

[Savovic] You all know very well that Serbia has done everything that you could stress in the world as an equal in the negotiations with Croatia, that it is supporting and aiding these people here in all aspects, and above all wants you to accomplish you desires and tendencies, wishes to accompany you in it and work on it together with you. The entire struggle that you are engaged in must result in life in one state.

[Vukadinovic] In the name of the SPS of the Serbian Republic, all present were greeted by party president Dr. Dragutin Ilic, who voiced the belief this party's program will very quickly gain popularity in the Serbian Republic:

[Ilic] We favor a single, unified Serbian state, and not little states or perhaps duchies, but a state that will have one parliament, one government, one president.

[Vukadinovic] By forming the communal committee, the first electoral conference of the Serbian Party of Socialists for the Knin commune has ended its work. [end recording]

### Army Unit Action in Bosnia, Croatia Viewed

*94BA0297B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 94 p 9*

[Interview with Colonel Miljenko Filipovic, commander of the Zrinski Regiment, by Snjezana Dukic; place and date not given: "If We Had Been Only 10 Minutes Late..."]

[Text] "The Zrinski Regiment has up to now been the best and most elite unit of the Croatian Army [HV] in its organization, its work, its structure, and its results. It is the only unit of all the so-called special forces at the beginning of the war which has survived to this day and has good results. All the rest have fallen apart. We do not live on memories like some people. Our performance results are almost the same in 1991 and 1993," says Colonel Miljenko Filipovic, commander of the Zrinski Regiment, a special unit of the Defense Ministry, which celebrated its third anniversary the other day.

A resident of Zagreb who was born in Tomislavgrad, a soldier in the Foreign Legion since 1984, his career is typical for legionnaires. On the wall of the Zrinski Regiment Command in Rakitje, there are several certificates of a parachutist, a diver, a commando leader, an instructor in hand-to-hand combat.... He has waged war throughout Africa from Djibouti, Chad, and Zaire to Rwanda as a member of an elite platoon of paratroops in the Legion. Motivated by events in Croatia, after arriving from the field in Africa in late 1990, he decided to leave the Foreign Legion. Although he still had two years of service to go under his contract in the Legion, working out cancellation of the contract through regular procedure was out of the question.

[Filipovic] I could no longer wait. At that time, there was a crisis in the Gulf between Iraq and Kuwait and I knew that I would be sent there, and that would have meant at least a year of warfare. Through my brother, I managed to obtain a passport and returned after seven years of being out of Croatia, and I left the Legion once and for all.

**Fine Lads**

[Dukic] At the beginning of the homeland war you trained members of the Antiterrorist Unit [ATJ] in Lucko. You passed on to them some of the knowledge and military skills from the Legion?

[Filipovic] Yes, I was an instructor in Lucko, but that was the police, and I am a professional soldier. There are big differences between the army and the police, and I was bothered most by the poor organization. To be sure, there were fine lads there, but they were unaccustomed to waging war and to the rigorous discipline that we had in the Legion. You do not become a professional soldier overnight. It takes at least five years for a soldier to go through training, to learn terrains, to learn tactics, to become resourceful, to get a taste of war. It takes more than pluck and bravery to wage war. You need equipment, good weapons, which at that time we did not have, and we were up against a well-equipped aggressor. We got our bearings and acquired weapons however we could. In actuality, the police were smuggling weapons in their own state. It sounds very funny, but at the time that is how it was. The Lucko ATJ was in those early days the unit principally responsible for all actions. Those boys were ready for anything, and as soon as they got a rifle in their hands they thought that they had everything and could do everything. They would say: "Man, what can tanks do to us...," and if tanks had come upon us at that moment they would have run over us all. Now the Croatian Army is slowly coming into its own. There will still be a great deal of work on its structure, but now we have both weapons and materiel, and the situation is no longer what it was in 1990.

[Dukic] When you transferred from the Lucko ATJ to the Defense Ministry, you and Colonel General Ante Rosa were given the task of forming the Zrinski Regiment. What did that look like at the beginning?

[Filipovic] The regiment was formed on 18 May 1991 by order of Gojko Susak, who at that time was deputy defense minister. On the actual day it was created, we had 27 volunteers who had been picked from among the 300 members of the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] at the training center in Kumrovec. They were enrolled through a strict selection procedure and subject to certain criteria, and that meant that they could not be over age 25, they had to have good psychophysical stability and conditioning, they had to be without family obligations, young men ready for anything....

**From Battle to Battle**

[Dukic] After General Rosa left for his new post in the Defense Ministry in the summer of 1991, you took over the place of regimental commander. What were your first actions?

[Filipovic] As early as mid-June 1991, we went to our first deployment in Vukovar, where our main task was to help in organizing and training the Vukovar volunteers, and we assisted Gen. Blago Zadra in a successful action to mop up Borovo Naselje. Then came Hrvatska Kostajnica, which we took back with one section of the 1st Guard Brigade. After that, the entire unit went to Gospic, where in a lightning action on 5 September we captured a convoy of armored vehicles of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] with 30 crew members, led by Gen. Krstevski. I received an order from Zagreb to let them all go home, but the "armor" remained in our hands. Then we took the Kaniza military warehouse, which we literally emptied in a single night. That meant a turning point in Gospic. The men were armed, and other garrisons in the vicinity were also falling. Toward the end of October, the regiment went to Metkovic with the task of helping in military operations in the liberation of Slano. In those actions, we took the most important elevation above Slano—Timor hill. In Operation Maslenica, the Zrinski Regiment played one of the more significant roles. Twice we conquered Skabrnja, we liberated the area from Smokovici to Murvica, we broke out onto the main highway, and we also rescued Novigrad from a new breakthrough of the chetnik forces. Had we been 10 minutes later that time, Novigrad would have fallen. We took part in the liberation of Dubrovnik. We were the first to take Golubov Kamen, but we had to withdraw because of poor coordination with our other units.

**Held Back by Politics**

[Dukic] So far, you have mainly talked about the more important actions. However, the Zrinski Regiment did much more than that, and some of your members even took part in battles on the territory of Herceg-Bosna.

[Filipovic] Yes, toward the end of 1991 we were training soldiers in Tomislavgrad. We took part in the battles on Kupres, which I commanded personally. The regiment liberated three-fourths of Kupres, but in the end it fell nevertheless, through no fault of ours.

[Dukic] Whose fault was it that Kupres fell, and how did you come to be a soldier of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina anyway?

[Filipovic] I know whose fault it was, but I do not want to talk about that now. Nevertheless, this was the beginning of the war in Herceg-Bosna, the army was not organized, the people were not ready. We had no one to rely on, and we were not able to carry all the burden ourselves. This is where we had our first men killed, and I myself was wounded. After it fell, we remained for a time in Herzegovina, helping to build the Croatian Defense Council [HVO].

You see, I was born in Tomislavgrad, and I was fighting in Herceg-Bosna as a volunteer. I cannot leave the graves of my ancestors to anyone. Absolutely not! Incidentally, when war broke out in Croatia, most of the volunteers came from Herzegovina, and they only went back to defend their own.

[Dukic] To what extent did political decisions and the signing of cease-fire agreements make the situation more difficult in the field?

[Filipovic] I am not interested in changes of policy, because I am above all a professional soldier. I am here to defend my homeland, my people, to respect its will. Few people in the world recognized Croatia in 1990 and 1991. It did not suit anyone for the former Yugoslavia to fall apart, and it is natural that it should have been extremely difficult for our politicians. But it must also be clear that politics was always holding us, the army, back. The Croatian Army is now sufficiently strong and well enough armed to take back all its borders. Let our politicians continue to go on solving everything by peaceful means, but if that is not possible, we are available.

### A Great Deal of Experience

[Dukic] What in your opinion is the key factor in building the Croatian Army?

[Filipovic] The Croatian Army will be among the best so long as the command positions are held by those who went through the entire homeland war waging war, who will be able to contribute thanks to their experience. We may also graduate from military schools at the university level and academies, but there is no substitute for practical experience.... The homeland war represents a great deal of experience of life and military experience, an important school. This cannot be learned anywhere, but only in war, out in the field!

[Dukic] What lies ahead for the Zrinski Regiment?

[Filipovic] In the new structure of the Croatian Army, the Zrinski Regiment will be part of the 1st Croatian Guard Corps, but we will continue to be a combat unit with special importance. The training of our members is being conducted from sunup to sundown. The requirements include conditioning drills, martial arts, parachute jumps, diver training, exercises in military tactics, and the recognition and handling of all types of weapons. There is not a moment's pause in all this. We are constantly learning, drilling, improving ourselves to be as good, strong, and ready as we can to protect Croatia and the Croatian people.

## New Croatian TV Director Interviewed

*94BA0297A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 94 pp 26-27*

[Text of interview with Mirko Galic, director of Croatian Radio-Television, by Boris Komadina; place and date not given: "Television Is No Cathedral"]

[Text] Mirko Galic's appointment as the new director of HRT [Croatian Radio-TV], following the initial hesitation, has evoked many comments, mainly favorable. Mirko Galic is one of the best-known journalists in Croatia, a former editor of DANAS, and until recently a correspondent of VECERNJI LIST and VJESNIK. Thanks to his reputation as a superb professional, many believe he will contribute to opening up government television and blunting the attack of numerous European institutions on Croatian TV [HTV].

[Komadina] When did you first learn that you were being considered for director of HRT?

[Galic] My name had been "in the pot" for some time, both for that and for certain other positions, which neither excited me nor interested me all that much. I am happiest when I can do my job as a journalist in peace, at present my job as a correspondent, unburdened by any kind of intrigues, especially those involving me and about me that are created by others without my knowledge. There have been such cases. They had me moved over to television before it was a serious consideration. And it became serious in the last two or three months, precisely since the Washington agreement. That is when the proposal was made to me, for the first time in Washington as a matter of fact, that I should help to create the kind of television Croatia needs. I did not accept at first, you can well imagine, because I am not sure I can do that, nor to what extent I will have the proper conditions. I examined myself, but also the circumstances, before I decided to accept.

[Komadina] To whom did you talk, and what reasons decided you in favor of accepting that post?

[Galic] I talked with those people with whom I had to talk about a decision like that. I did not manage to talk to everyone I wanted to, because some were away from Zagreb at the time. It seems to me that we agreed on what was most important for me—that my job has to do with the programming, not the technology or the finances of Croatian Television. That is all I would know about anyway: I have been a journalist for 25 years, I

have gained some experience, I have certain ideas, I still have some determination and energy. The rest is not up to me.

[Komadina] Is it true, as we have heard, that you talked twice to President Tudjman, who accepted your condition for precise delimitation of powers at HRT?

[Galic] There is no secret or mystery about those to whom I talked. I do not see what the problem is. I did not arrange conferences with those people after every meeting. With Mr. Tudjman, those were really working conversations, they were really frank and open, exclusively about those conditions under which I would go to work in television. I received the guarantees I requested; they still need to be elaborated so that there are no misunderstandings. I have always believed that preparations are half of the job; that is why I endeavored to such an extent to have my rights and also my obligations and responsibilities defined. That part of the agreement is still not finished. There is time yet, the government has (only) appointed me, I still have not taken up my duties as director.

[Komadina] From the French perspective, how do you see the continual and clear accusations of the work of HRTV by European parliamentarians?

[Galic] Television is what is most visible in any country; it is a screen presented to the world. We should be aware that Croatia will be judged for a long time on the basis of its television. France can afford a television that ruins the picture of a democratic country; in one study, it was in only 25th place in the ranking of the freedom of the media (Belgium is first), and that is because of its television, which is more under commercial than political pressure. Croatia cannot afford that, first, because it needs an open and democratic television in order to develop a democratic culture and the culture of democratic thinking, and second, because television represents a part of its European test. The Council of Europe, as the first step, and the European Parliament, as the second, require a candidate to guarantee an independent and pluralistic television. If everything goes well, toward the end of this year Croatia could cross the first European threshold in Strasbourg. But when delegations of the Council of Europe come to Zagreb soon, I can imagine with quite a bit of confidence what they will ask: How does television express the pluralism of political life? How does the state exercise its influence on television (and more broadly on the media)?

[Komadina] As future director of HRT, what is your comment on the fact that Croatia is one of the rare countries (if not the only one) in which legal private television stations do not exist?

[Galic] I personally am an advocate of private television, I had taken that position in a study done a year ago, when my coming to HTV was discussed for the first time. Public television—I like that name more than the name government television—is still the backbone of public information; private television should furnish elements of competition and dynamism. But the conditions should be clearly defined for them both, so that we know what standards and quality have to be met, what are the relations between the domestic and foreign programming, what are obligations concerning the news, and so on. It has seemed to me, and it still does, that Croatia ought to have two public channels, the first more on the serious side and the second more on the entertainment side, one private national channel and several regional private television stations. Meanwhile, we ought to define the standards and the code, appoint a special independent council (the present one is too cumbersome) that would monitor how television, both public and private, is respecting its basic obligations as to objectivity, pluralism, and the distribution in programming.

[Komadina] Do you think that HRT must be a "cathedral of the Croatian spirit"?

[Galic] Croatia has its cathedrals, they should be given freedom to do what belongs to them. But let television be television. If you really want my slogan, I would say that it should be Croatian, democratic, and European. Incidentally, that is what I said in all my conversations.

[Komadina] What is your comment on Mr. Vrdoljak's statement that you never would have been heard of, that you would have been anonymous, if it had not been for television?

[Galic] Many have called my attention to that statement, some have asked me to react. As though it were offensive. I laughed when I read it. I do not know what else Mr. Vrdoljak said, maybe that statement sounds different in context. But I do not intend to prove to him nor anyone else that I am not an anonymous journalist and that I did exist even before television. It is true that television expands the borders of a journalist's (any journalist's) recognition, and that is exactly what I always wanted to avoid. With television, after all, one loses a portion of privacy. Vrdoljak's statement is probably an element of his style. As far as I am concerned, it will not affect collaboration.

[Komadina] Please comment on the charges which have been made that you are "a man for all times," which allude to your work on DANAS and in the socialist system in general.

[Galic] I heard that question once before, and my answer was the same as I make to you: Regimes come and go, the journalists remain! If, of course, they are professionals, if they are not too close to the regime, if they are not "regime journalists." What would it be like if the corps of journalists changed with every change? You are right if you are thinking that 1990 was not an ordinary change, because that was the beginning of the time of democracy, which contrasted with and followed the period of one-party government, that is, totalitarianism. But can democracy remove people, professional journalists? Especially those who in the period of one-dimensional

thinking displayed courage in expressing other and different thoughts, even opposite thoughts. I am not certain that in citing DANAS you have chosen a good example: That publication, while I headed it (I am not talking about what it was before or afterward), was ahead of the times, precisely because it was disseminating a certain pluralism, because it was developing free criticism, because in the time of the "Croatian silence" it was defending certain threatened Croatian interests, from politics to language. It might seem to you today that that was not very much, but for that time, believe me, it was too much. My head was frequently on the block.

[Komadina] Many consider you the most successful editor in the recent history of Croatian journalism. Why did you leave DANAS just when it had reached its peak?

[Galic] I will let others speak to how successful or unsuccessful I have been. I will give you just two figures: When I took over the periodical, it had a printing of 43,000 (30,000 sold), and when I left the printing was 110,000 (more than 90,000 sold). I left because I was tired: It was not easy to run an editorial office that was markedly heterogeneous, to withstand the constant criticism from the Vjesnik establishment and the great threats from outside, which came even from the prosecutors. In 1988, the Journalists Society awarded me the annual prize for the editing of DANAS. The citation is worth reading today: The first sentence speaks about the good things I did, and the rest about mistakes, about failures. On the basis of that citation, I should have been punished, not rewarded. I knew the background: When some of the powers that be at that time heard that I had been given a prize, they made an uproar: How can you give an award to DANAS? Because the decision could not be changed, they changed the citation. I can say that most of the editorial staff was on my side, that within the establishment a certain stratification began into supporters and critics of DANAS, that there were allies and opponents even in Croatian politics.... But when I submitted my request to leave, no one said: Don't! Some were overjoyed.

[Komadina] How would you describe the situation in Croatian journalism at the moment?

[Galic] It is typical of the postcommunist period: There has been a stratification, everything is still at the halfway mark. If aggression against Croatia had not broken out, it all would probably have gone faster, from privatization of the media to definition of journalists. But even so, the changes are obvious, especially in the newspapers, which are moving over a broad front, from the papers that support the government and the incumbent party, and then papers which maintain a certain independence and nurture pluralism, to periodicals whose sympathies are oppositionist. That is democracy. One can only wish for it to go further and faster and for commercial interests not to smother serious journalism.

## Tesla Telecommunications Firm Bought by Swedes

*94P20869A Maribor VECER in Slovene 4 Jun 94 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Tesla in the Hands of Eriksson"]

[Text] After three months of negotiations among the Swedish telecommunications company Eriksson, the Croatian Government, and the Privatization Fund, the Fund's Board of Directors decided at a meeting to accept the Swedish firm's offer to buy Tesla. To meet the negotiated price of 70 million German marks [DM], the Swedes will pay DM20 million in cash, DM25 million in equipment, and hand over patent rights worth DM25 million. Eriksson's purchase of Tesla is considered one of the most important steps in the privatization process in Croatia in terms of the future of its employees rather than purely as a business deal. Over a five-year period the work force will be gradually reduced from 3,500 to 1,000, after the surplus employees have been retrained.

## Citizens' Activities To Restore Name of Square

*94BA0289A Split FERAL TRIBUNE in Serbo-Croatian 9 May 94 p 6*

[Article by Zoran Pusic: "Victory Day: The Square of Victims and Their Rulers"]

[Text] In September 1990 the Assembly of the city of Zagreb made the decision to change the name of the Square of the Victims of Fascism to the Square of Croatian Rulers. All streets that lead to the square have been given the names of various medieval Croatian rulers. Thus, the part of Rudjer Boskovic Street that leads to the square in question was renamed King Drzislav Street. Even Mestrovic's pavilion, built immediately prior to the war (in 1990 it was not necessary to emphasize particularly which war was being referred to), and conceived as a lasting display of modern art, which at the time of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] was converted into a mosque, and after the war into the Museum of the Revolution of the People of Croatia, must now become a pantheon-mausoleum for (future?) Croatian rulers.

When this decision of the City Assembly was announced, protests by citizens took place en masse and petitions were written, and on 22 September 1990 a large number of Zagreb residents gathered (on that day alone 2,371 people signed a petition of protest against changing the name) in front of Mestrovic's pavilion, encircling the whole pavilion with candles as a sign of remembrance of the victims of fascism and as a sign of protest against the decision to change the name of the square.

The mayor at that time, Boris Buzancic, informed the president of the republic about the dissatisfaction of part of the citizens with the decision to rename the Square of the Victims of Fascism, but the president was unyielding in his conviction of the need for the renaming. He gave up the idea of the pantheon and a version of the Square

of Croatian rulers, but on the afternoon of 27 November 1990 the plates with the name Square of the Victims of Fascism were removed and replaced with new ones. In stealth, almost secretly, and, as Srdjan Dvornik will say in an appropriate article, "as if suitable for an unworthy act." It reminded many people of the removal of the monument to Ban Jelacic, with which another government "announced with the support of a plebescite that everything was starting anew with it."

Officially, it has been the Square of Croatian Greats since then; unofficially, the Square of the Victims of Fascism for many residents of Zagreb.

A Council for Action on the Square of Victims of Fascism has been founded, which writes petitions, gathers signatures, and organizes speaker's platforms, is issuing the booklet Square of Victims of Fascism in Zagreb. Among the numerous arguments as to why the name Square of the Victims of Fascism should be restored, the following are repeated:

—that this name is a reminder of the thousands of Zagreb antifascists who did that which was most worthy in the history of the people—oppose darkness and tyranny when the darkness seemed impenetrable and the tyranny undefeatable;

—that this name is a reminder of the thousands of citizens of Zagreb and citizens of Croatia, victims of fascism, who were not antifascist, only of another nation, another faith, or another race;

—that right on that square during the NDH, there were Ustashi and Gestapo prisons, through which thousands of victims of fascism passed;

—that countries of today's Europe, when they speak of the vision of a Europe of prosperity, do not call on their totalitarian, nation-building regimes from the past, but on the values that have always been the hope of the oppressed and those deprived of rights—freedom and the worth of the individual, the universality of human rights, and tolerance of differences.

The president of the Republic has answered all the arguments and petitions cited: "The restoration of the name Square of Victims of Fascism is sought by political dilettantes and exhibitionists." (VJESNIK, April 1991)

Since 9 May 1991, the Council for Action on the Square of the Victims of Fascism has organized each year, at 1800 hours, a gathering of citizens as a sign of observance of the Day of Europe-Day of Victory.

On that day the demand for the restoration of the name Square of the Victims of Fascism is always repeated. This name has become not only a symbol of arrogance and the devastation that the ruling group caused during the antifascist part of Croatian history, but also that narrow watershed that can determine if a country wishes to move toward an appropriate well-being for its citizens oriented to administrative organization, or ends in totalitarianism and repression. Naturally, the existence (or restoration) of the name Square of the Victims of Fascism is not a sure guarantee even of this, but for this reason a national government that removes names of streets and squares of victims of fascism, and puts up names of fascist war criminals, has oriented itself quite certainly to the trash heap of history. The way through Gospic, Pakracka Poljana, Ahmic, the Mostar stadium....

Croatia has earned something quite a bit better than such nostalgic NDH people, who cannot restore the name Square of the Victims of Fascism, but who can, to the detriment and shame of Croatia, introduce the kuna as Croatian currency. The best that this government can do for Croatia is to lose democratically organized elections and withdraw, in a democracy of customary consequence. Restoration of the name Square of the Victims of Fascism is conditional on a change in the existing government. Or, as it could be said with a little optimism as a paraphrase of a famous sentence: "Next year on the Square of the Victims of Fascism!"

### ΩState of Economy Examined, Analyzed

*94P20866A*

[Editorial Report] The state of the Slovene economy, especially its strong position among the East European and Central European economies in transition, has been the subject of analyses in Ljubljana and Belgrade economic journals and mass media.

According to the 13 January issue of the Ljubljana economic weekly GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK, Slovenia enjoys a comparative advantage because it started its transition to a market economy as the "most developed" of the former socialist countries, although it is the smallest in population (2 million in 1992) and size (20,000 square km). In 1993 Slovenia led in per capita GDP ($6,186) and purchasing power ($8,500). While the transition to a market economy caused recession in all the former socialist economies, such trends were "less intense" in Slovenia. The journal also noted that Slovenia has better prospects than the Visegrad Group countries because the Slovene economy has been "traditionally export-oriented" and, as such, influenced by trends in the global economy. According to some economic experts, who have dubbed Slovenia "the Switzerland of the countries in transition," the country has already reached the level of the "less-developed members of the European Union."

The 19 May issue of GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK analyzed positive and negative trends in the Slovene economy. On the positive side, the journal pointed out that:

—After a period of stagnation and decline, the economy grew in the third quarter of 1993, indicating a gradual economic revival;

—The national currency, the tolar, has been stabilized—the monthly inflation rate is averaging 2 percent, with inflation estimated to total 18.5 percent in 1994;

—Foreign debt is relatively low;

—Exports make up two-thirds of the GDP, the highest in this country group;

—Structural economic reforms and the rehabilitation of banks are "progressing successfully."

On the negative side, GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK noted a 15-percent unemployment rate caused mainly by recession in the industrial sector. Data show that unemployment continues to present "one of the most difficult problems," particularly among the "less educated work force." Although the private sector is rapidly expanding, it is unable to generate sufficient new jobs. The journal sees increased production as the only long-term solution to unemployment.

Another problem mentioned in the article is low productivity reflected in low wages. Slovenia's average monthly net wage of $415 nevertheless represents the highest reported monthly income among the former socialist countries. GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK concluded that Slovenia is on the right path to recovery, while conceding that the pace of privatization is lagging.

The 16 May issue of the Belgrade economic weekly EKONOMSKA POLITIKA observed that the Slovene economy "navigates well" between recession and post-socialist economic difficulties. Citing the financial journal EUROMONEY and the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies, the Belgrade weekly predicted "possible" economic growth for Slovenia in 1994 and stronger commercial activities, thanks to "new export markets" in the Czech Republic and Hungary. According to EKONOMSKA POLITIKA, the Vienna Institute anticipated 1-percent economic growth for 1994 resulting from exports, 20-percent annual inflation, and 18-percent unemployment.

Further confirmation that Slovene industrial production is increasing in response to growing local demand, ECONOMSKA POLITIKA reported, came from the Ljubljana Economic Institute in March. Institute economists attributed the increase in retail trade to the boost received from "invisible" exports to Croatia—many Croatian citizens shopping in Slovenia.

Citing data from the Slovene Statistics Institute, EKONOMSKA POLITIKA noted that retail prices rose 3.9 percent in the first quarter of 1994, while the overall cost of living increased 4.7 percent. The value of exports in January and February was $915.6 million, with imports worth $856.1 million. Trade with the Yugoslav successor states continued to decline.

Signs of economic growth and general improvement in employment opportunities for 1994 have also been confirmed by the Ljubljana Economic Institute in its April survey of economic trends, as reported by Ljubljana Radio on 16 May and the Ljubljana daily DELO on 18 May. The Institute reported that rising production spurred by an increase in demand led to high levels of retail trade and a reduction in the stock of unsold goods. The following Institute data for the first quarter of 1994 was published in DELO:

—Industrial production grew 3 percent compared to a year ago.

—Unemployment, while still "one of the key problems," has started to abate.

—Trade is balancing out. Foreign debt increased by $29 million and foreign currency reserves by $148 million, nearing a total of $1.8 billion—sufficient to cover 90 percent of Slovenia's total foreign debt.

—The large supply of foreign currency is supporting the exchange rate of the Slovene tolar, which was devalued by almost 2 percent during the first four months of 1994.

—Inflationary pressures are diminishing despite a 6.1-percent increase in retail prices and a 4.5-percent increase in manufacturers' prices.

## Federal

### Bogdanovic Views Clinton Remarks on Sanctions

*LD1006182694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1752 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Belgrade, June 10 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Parliament Upper House President Radmilo Bogdanovic assessed on Friday that the time for easing the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) was approaching, judging by statements supporting a cessation of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia made by U.S. President Bill Clinton and the European Union. Bogdanovic said this during talks with representatives of the "Min" mechanical engineering factory in Nis (Serbia).

The United Nations in May 1992 imposed comprehensive sanctions against Yugoslavia for its alleged involvement in the civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Clinton was actually threatening the Bosnian Moslems when he spoke of the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia, according to Slobodan Rakitic, opposition Depos [Democratic Movement of Serbia] bloc deputy in the Yugoslav Parliament. "The sanctions against Yugoslavia will be softened if a Moslem-Croat federation rejects a peace plan," a statement signed by Rakitic on behalf of a group of Depos MPs said.

Clinton's statement could be understood as a kind of confession that neither the introduction of sanctions had depended on Serbia, Montenegro and the Bosnian Serb Republic (R.S.), the statement also said. "If the lifting of the sanctions is announced now as punishing the Moslems for disobedience, then the introduction was a reward to a Moslem-Croat coalition for their war option," the announcement said.

Delegations of the Moslem-Croat Federation and of the Bosnian Serb republic signed on Wednesday in Geneva a one-month ceasefire accord, althouth the Serb side was for a one-year cessation of hostilities, estimating that a one-month ceasefire is too short for finding a political settlement to end the Bosnian war.

### Foreign Minister Views U.S. Congress Decision

*AU1006200194 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1452 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic by Dragan Colovic on the "An Argument More" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Colovic] Minister Jovanovic, our public received with great trepidation the news from Washington that the U.S. Congress House of Representatives had, by a great majority, adopted the amendment demanding that President Clinton unilaterally lift the arms embargo for the Bosnian Muslims. How do you see this?

[Jovanovic] This is a continuation of the position in U.S. policy, which from the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been insisting on a so-called hard solution, on pressure, on blackmailing the Serbian side in the hope that this would yield maximum results. This line in the U.S. policy is not always consistent; very often it is in contradiction with the official line that has always been a lot more considerate and has taken into account the repercussions of such a position on other U.S. interests, on relations with the allies, and finally, on the U.S. strategy of using sanctions on a global scale, whenever U.S. state or national interests warrant it. Therefore, a possible surrender to this hard line could initially bring some advantages to immediate U.S. policy, but, in the long run, it would threaten many other goals, particularly the option of using sanctions as the most lethal, albeit most inhuman and most undemocratic means in the current policy of this great power.

On the other hand, the Islamic lobby—which is very powerful and which is just a herald of the monolithic political bloc of the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO]—is active in all spheres, and it is particularly focused on the U.S. decisionmaking centers, knowing that if it manages to win over the United States, it will have an easier time dealing with the other political factors. In this respect, President Clinton is certainly exposed to immense pressure—both internally and externally—which he has so far successfully resisted. The assumption and the logical conclusion is that the President will succeed in resisting this to the end, because all the pros and cons of such an action—the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina—imply that the cons would prevail over the pros, and that the number one man of this great power would have to be a great gambler to opt for this voluntarily. The threat is nevertheless serious, this time it comes from the united Congress—both wings of Congress have practically voted in favor of lifting the embargo—and President Clinton will need a lot of skill, strength, and time to relativize this pressure and to maintain the peaceful option as the general option in his country's policy toward the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that he will look for strength of argument for his position in the dynamics of the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina itself or about Bosnia-Herzegovina [sentence as heard]. I believe that this is the best way to match this warmongering wing, which does not only come from within—from the U.S. Congress—but also from an extremely militant Islamic bloc that is on the offensive and is trying to minimize the significance of the achievements—modest as they may be—of the peace process so far, and is trying to marginalize and diminish the process itself.

[Colovic] Minister, earlier you mentioned the sanctions. It is interesting to note that this dangerous U.S. congressmen's initiative comes at a time when the first hints of a change in U.S. policy toward the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina are becoming apparent in the sense that the U.S. President has announced the possibility of relaxing

the sanctions toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. How do you explain this?

[Jovanovic] Well, you see, it is probable that the [word indistinct] Congress for the lifting of the embargo and the announcement of the possibility of relaxing the sanctions are part of the same policy—the policy of a stick and a carrot. On the one hand, the possibility of lifting the embargo is intended to apply psychological and political pressure on the Serbian side in Bosnia-Herzegovina so that it becomes frightened and more yielding in the peace negotiations, while on the other hand, the announcement of the possibility of relaxing or lifting the sanctions should apply a similar pressure that would reflect on, and as such be registered by the Muslim side in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These two things are, after all, part of the same whole, although each one has its own autonomy, particularly the first one that concerns the embargo, of which I have already spoken.

The important thing for us is that this positive evolution in the U.S. Administration's position toward the sanctions is, at least verbally, continuing. Moreover, for a month and a half now, we have had these new tones that imply that the policy of this country toward the sanctions is not firm, but is also a dynamic process that can be adjusted depending on the positive changes in solving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is probably a reflection of the fact that the United States—along with all of Europe, with the exception of Austria, Albania, and Turkey—is also becoming aware of the fact that the sanctions have lost their raison d'etre, that they are beginning to inflict losses on their initiators, and that they are beginning to think about how to rid themselves of these sanctions without losing face and particularly without losing face on the ground. [sentence as heard] It is conceivable that all this is part of a whole, and it would not surprise us if the United States—providing some undesirable turnabout does not happen in Bosnia-Herzegovina—were to give us a new, similar, positive surprise in the coming weeks.

[Colovic] A pleasant surprise in any case. Mr. Jovanovic, in recent days, the international factors have been trying to speed up and intensify the peace process, particularly after the one-month cease-fire was accepted. All this is aimed at urging the acceptance of a territorial demarcation, and finally a political solution. What developments can we expect after Geneva? Are not perhaps certain pitfalls also present in this speeding up of the process? One of the pitfalls could be that a solution might be imposed which, instead of contributing to the end of the war, could lead to its escalation?

[Jovanovic] First of all, this progress, the one-month cease-fire—which is very modest—is nevertheless progress because it maintains the momentum of both the negotiations and the relative stabilization of the situation on the ground. However, it is so minimal that to count on it in any way would be to grossly deceive oneself. We need to urgently invest new and essential efforts in order to prevent the Muslim side—once the month is over—from launching military operations, or complicating both the negotiations and the situation and in this way forcing the whole world to go with their variant rather than the peace variant that is the current name of the game. Therefore, there is a realistic chance of the Muslim side setting traps, and it stems from both the Muslim side in Bosnia-Herzegovina and from its friends and supporters on the other side—the Islamic bloc and friends in the U.S. Congress.

On the other hand, hints that the new division and the new package of the peace solution could be placed on the table in the form of take-it-or-leave-it, must not be lightly dismissed because it is obvious that this type of activity at international meetings is pretty familiar, particularly to certain Western powers. The problem is that until now, this was only employed on the Serbian side in Bosnia, and on Yugoslavia in connection with the Yugoslav crisis, whereas it was never employed on the other sides. Even if this time it was employed against both, or all three sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there would still be a realistic danger that this pressure—in respect to the Serbs in Bosnia—would be overdone, more pronounced than the possible pressure on the Muslims.

Finally, the fact that it has been implied that the Muslims, in exchange for the lifting of the arms embargo, could be, so to speak, punished by the relaxation of the sanctions against us, is not proportional, because the lifting of the sanctions [as heard] would be an introduction to a long war, while the relaxation of the sanctions would be just a partial alleviation of Yugoslavia's position under the burden of sanctions. We must be careful and the international community must be reminded of something it kept reiterating, which is that it would respect the consensus of the warring factions and that it would not impose the political solution of either side. If it were to adhere to this, then there would be no danger of this happening.

However, we must not forget that a year ago, during the time of the Vance-Owen plan, there was an attempt at imposing such a solution on one side—the Serbian side—in Bosnia, and that after it rejected this, the famous UN Security Council Resolution 820 was passed. Therefore, all the cards are in the game, nothing has been excluded in advance, and it is possible that the international community—under the pressure of an ultimatum-like offer—will aim it at only one, the Serbian side, while the other side is faced only with a cosmetic ultimatum [sentence as heard]. This unbalance, as a consequence of the double standards applied so far in solving the Yugoslav crisis, is still predominant in the policy and position of the leading Western countries.

## Foreign Ministry Welcomes Bosnian Cease-Fire

*LD1006154894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1414 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Text] Belgrade, 10 Jun (TANJUG)—The FRY expects the cease-fire signed in Geneva on Wednesday by representatives of the Bosnia- Herzegovina warring sides to be

an introduction to a permanent peace, according to a statement issued today by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The statement welcomes the agreement on the cessation of hostilities and says that "even though it would have been much better for the successful continuation of negotiations and attainment of a final political solution if the sides had reached agreement on a permanent peace, or at least on a long-term cease- fire, this agreement can serve as an impetus for ending the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis."

The statement goes on to say that full compliance with the one- month cease-fire is important, because only then can this short period of time be used to make progress in the negotiations.

It is necessary that the international players attentively and objectively follow further developments on the ground and sanction each attempt to violate the cease-fire, irrespective of the source. As for the Serb side in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it has on a number of occasions expressed its orientation toward peace, continuation of dialogue, and cessation of all hostilities.

The forthcoming one-month period must be used in the best possible way for finding a final, just, and permanent solution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regardless of the fact that it is not one of the warring sides, the FRY is ready to make a maximum contribution to realizing this goal, the statement says.

## FRY To Respond to 'Any Kind' of Aggression

*LD1206124894 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1225 GMT 12 Jun 94*

["Pool" item]

[Text] Kragujevac, June 12 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic said on Sunday that the defensive capability of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) was well maintained despite the big problems and all objective hardships caused by the two-year-old international sanctions.

Bulatovic, in an interview to Radio Kragujevac, Serbia, pointed out that the Army of Yugoslavia had a highly developed system of the country's defences.

"It is common knowledge," said he, "that Yugoslavia does not have any territorial claims on any of its neighbours, but it is ready to respond to aggression of any kind." He confirmed that some of the neighbour states were launching provocations along the Yugoslav borders, counting on external support. This, as he said, was nothing new, because they used to do the same whenever they thought Yugoslavia was weakened by internal troubles and by pressures exerted by the big powers.

Asked about the danger of Yugoslavia's being involved in war, with reference to NATO violations of Yugoslavia's airspace, Bulatovic said that "no one in his right mind has any interest in involving Yugoslavia into a war, as this would widespread the war conflagration in the Balkans, and it is the big question whether (the war) would be limited to this area alone.

"Every impartial observer may realize that Serbia and Montenegro, that is, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had not started the war on the soil of the former Yugoslavia, and that they have no intention of including themselves in it. On the contrary, they are doing their utmost for paths to be found for the establishment of just and lasting peace in these areas," said Bulatovic.

## Kontic on Economy, 'Short-Term' Cease-Fire

*LD1006165494 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1440 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 10 Jun (TANJUG)—Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said today that an extraordinary parliamentiary session would be justified only if implementation of the economic stabilization program was threatened.

Speaking at a regular news conference he said that the government will closely monitor the implementation of this year's economic policy and, depending on the situation, would decide whether or not to convene an extraordinary session. [passage omitted]

Answering a question about the cease-fire in the former Bosnia- Herzegovina and the decision of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress on the lifting of the embargo on arms imports for the Muslims, Kontic said that a short-term cease-fire, as well as the decision on lifting the embargo, are encouraging Muslims to persist in the war option. He added that some of President Clinton's statements that the arms embargo will not be lifted were encouraging.

Asked about the army and police allegedly stepping up their activities in Raska, about which the Muslim National Council of Sandzak has informed foreign journalists, Kontic said that this was not true and that such claims are spread in order to exert pressure on Serbia, primarily from abroad. He added that he had given instructions for an investigation to be carried out. [passage omitted]

## Sainovic on Strategies To Cut Budget Deficit

*AU1006205994 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 10 Jun 94*

[Interview with Nikola Sainovic, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deputy prime minister, by Dusko Petrovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Studio announcer] The decreasing of public expenditure and primarily the decreasing of the deficit in the federal and republican budgets is an extremely important task. The further successful realization of the program of monetary reconstruction and the country's

economic recovery greatly depends on it. It is well-known that the Serbian Government has already undertaken concrete measures and activities in order to further decrease the deficit in the republic's coffers and to ensure that it is reimbursed only from real sources. What the Federal Government plans to do in this respect is the question that DNEVNIK put to Deputy Premier Nikola Sainovic.

[Sainovic] We knew from the start that this was going to be a difficult and very responsible task, but we planned in the program to accomplish within six months something that this state could not accomplish for years and that is to annul the budget deficit. The results accomplished so far prove that this task can be accomplished. The National Bank has already lent both the republican and federal budgets less than was planned in the program, and as things stand now, I am convinced that we are going to accomplish this task regardless of all the difficulties that accompany it.

In the same way that the economy—in conditions of a real economy—is expected to produce, market, and live only on the results of its work, the federation and the republics must get along on the funds available, and we are going to accomplish this.

[Petrovic] This assumes the ongoing financing of the federal state and the federal units from real sources. Will the federal state in July or August perhaps convert to borrowing money on the money market and other sources?

[Sainovic] The basic thing is that in the second half of the year, we are going to convert to financing only from real sources, and the state should ideally finance itself from its primary sources. Since it is not possible to decrease the deficit solely by saving—all the existing consumers cutting expenses, monitoring every penny, and so forth—the Federal Government will initiate the implementation of a concept of reorganization of the federal administration, which will be a program that we have never had so far, not since the founding of this federal state.

[Petrovic] Deputy Prime Minister, we can soon expect to see a more efficient and modern federal state, more appropriate to the conditions we are living under, the needs of the economy and the citizens?

[Sainovic] On the basis of the concept that has been prepared, we are going to implement such a reorganization of the federal administration that it will be possible to precisely pinpoint the responsibility of each ministry or an individual part of it; there will be no great number of organizational units in which responsibility and efficiency will be lost; there will be fewer employees, the entire administration will fit into one building—the palace of the Federal Executive Council, and I am convinced that this will represent the federal administration's significant contribution to the program's realization.

[Petrovic] Thank you very much.

[Sainovic] Thank you.

## Serb Indicted for War Crimes in Bosnia, Serbia

*94BA0293A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 94 pp 28-29*

[Article by Jovan Dulovic: "At the Center of Hell"]

[Text] Dusan Vuckovic (age 30), known as Repic, from Umka near Belgrade, is charged in an indictment with having killed 16 and wounded 20 innocent Muslim civilians from the village Divic when he was a member of the notorious Yellow Ants volunteer unit, and with having raped a 35-year-old Muslim woman in Mali Zvornik (SR [Socialist Republic] Serbia) from whom he then took 1,000 German marks. His elder brother Vojin Vuckovic (age 31), better known by his nickname Zuca, commander of the Yellow Ants, is charged with unauthorized possession of a sizable quantity of weapons and has been released on bail pending trial.

All the details in the indictment have not yet been made public, but it is known that during the investigation the brothers were suspected of having released bloodthirsty pit bull terriers to attack imprisoned civilians and of organizing nighttime duels, that is, compelled the Muslims to fight each other to the death with knives. The winner was promised freedom. It is not known whether the investigation was able to support those suspicions with evidence or witness testimony. Branko Njegovan, district public prosecutor, says that on 27 or 28 June 1992 Dusan Vuckovic cut off the ear of a prisoner in the culture center in the village of Celopek, where inhabitants of the village Divic had been imprisoned. (This was a commonplace gesture in units made up of convicts released from prison to fight on battlefields in Bosnia. They would prove their accomplishment in ethnic cleansing with the ears they had cut off, and this was closely bound up with reduction of their sentences.) Then he fired an entire burst (of 30 rounds) from a Kalashnikov into civilians.

Dusan Vuckovic has reportedly confessed to having killed seven people. In a trial of volunteers from some paramilitary unit (which one has not been announced) the other day in the same court, Andjelko Trninic (age 27), a machine technician from Klupci near Loznica, and his contemporary Dragomir Zekic, an electrician from the vicinity of Zvornik, the prosecutor says, murdered Milenko Vidovic, a physician from Mali Zvornik, in a perfidious way on 16 July 1992. What is special about that crime is the motive and the manner in which it was committed. Arrested exactly a year ago, during the entire time of criminal proceedings and the trial Andjelko Trninic was categorical: "I cut the doctor's throat on patriotic grounds." Trninic actually is not defending himself, he is not contrite. He speaks of the crime as though he expects recognition for patriotic service.

Andjelko Trninic's explanation delivered to the court is interesting: "We heard that Dr. Vidovic was smuggling drugs and medical supplies, and so Zekic and I went to check it out. When we had drunk the drink the doctor offered, I pulled out a pistol and ordered him to show us everything that he had there in the house. There was a sizable quantity of drugs piled on the sofa, shelves, and in bureaus. The doctor's justification was that the drugs were needed for the patients he treats privately. It was clear to me that Vidovic was a traitor to the Serbian people," Trninic concluded. Dragomir Zekic described the act of execution in more detail: "Trninic then went into the bathroom with Vidovic, and on the basis of what I heard, I concluded that they were still talking about the drugs. Some 10 minutes later he asked me to bring him the knife from the kitchen. I thought he needed it to open some box or to frighten Vidovic. Then Trninic ordered the doctor to kneel down beside the bathtub...." They put Milenko Vidovic with his throat slit into the bathtub and took an automatic rifle and pistol from the apartment. Trninic says that he received the order to execute the doctor from his command, which was stationed at that time in Zvornik. Expert witnesses concluded that Andjelko Trninic was at the time he committed [text missing from original].

**From White to Yellow**

All the things that happened along the left bank of the Drina beginning in early spring 1992 have largely remained unknown to the public. In Mali Zvornik, the very first glance made it clear at that time that something strange was happening in Zvornik; on the Serbian side, the bridges were blocked with sandbags, on which were machine guns with loaded belts, aimed at the other bank of the Drina, where a big sign said "Srpska republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" to mark the border. In addition to the weapons, uniformed police, members of the military police, men in camouflage uniforms without insignia, and several civilians whom all addressed with deference (the republic MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs]) were also keeping a close eye on what happened on the other side. "You do not know, my friend, what kind of riffraff had collected in Zvornik. Offspring of an evil father and a mother who was worse. Better not to go there unless you had to," suggested the border guards on the bridge whom we mentioned, also remarking that "twice the looters from Zvornik have attacked the bridge with weapons in an attempt to carry away booty and arms into Serbia."

Zvornik was at that time crowded with various armed groupings: the White Eagles, the Dragon's People (they referred to their leader as the Dragon), the Yellow Ants, the Yellow Jackets, Cele's Volunteers, Peja's Guards, unidentified little groups that called themselves "special units," various detachments for special purposes.... They all looked askance at one another with weapons in their hands and a bullet in the chamber. "A quiet war is being waged here for power, and the situation is very tense," explained the Zvornik TO [Territorial Defense] commander, who introduced himself as Marko, although the chiefs of certain units close to the authorities in Belgrade said that this was a certain Branko Popovic, Mihalj Kertes' man, who had done a great deal in bringing down the advocates of autonomy in Vojvodina. From what Marko said, as soon as an armed group would burst into the city, it would immediately try to take power, that is, to disarm Marko and the TO forces, and then to confront the menacing rival armed groups which were also laying claim to power, and the attempt would fail. Marko was surviving as commander without any authority or the strength to restore order.

A few km from Zvornik, in a restaurant named "The Four Teats" (owned by two sisters), the leader of one of the most numerous groups (it is not wise to mention the names even today) openly said that he had come to Zvornik as a Serbian patriot above political parties to use his men to purge the Serbian land of Muslims, justifying the necessity for ethnic cleansing with the words of Radovan Karadzic, president of the Srpska republic, that "the Serbs no longer have any reason whatsoever to beg the Muslims to live together in the same state." Judging, however, by the great number of gold chains around his neck, mostly women's, and the rings on his fingers, one got the impression that for the members of the paramilitary units killing Muslims was only a cover for looting. "Tonight, we did our work in the nearby Muslim village with cold steel, we did not fire a round," the volunteers would relate in the restaurant, slapping the knives decorated with cockades that hung from their belts. Psychiatrists would have said of many of them that they are personally unhappy and mentally poisoned and corrupted people who are able to nurture this kind of aggressiveness thanks to a corrupted environment.

The Ants of Zuca (Vojin Vuckovic) were spoken of in eastern Bosnia as one of the most cruel units. "They left nothing alive behind," members of other quite similar paramilitary units would remark respectfully. The other day, there was a newspaper article (POLITIKA EKSPRES, 13 May) that said that "the Yellow Ants have done much evil in Bosnia, and in early August 1992 the special forces from Pale managed to disarm and arrest them." This is what kids would call baloney. The allegedly arrested Ants were even shown on TV. However, that same evening the arrestees and the special forces celebrated their successful farce in the restaurant near Zvornik we have mentioned; its purpose was obviously to deceive the public. It was supposed to be interpreted in terms of the law-governed state in Pale effectively removing the criminals and looters from its territory.

**Torching of Villages**

Up to the end of August 1992 there were so many problematical people armed to the teeth in Zvornik and environs that there was no force to disarm them and drive them out of a city overwhelmed by lawlessness. Anyone could do what he wanted to, loot or kill, without fear of being subject to criminal prosecution or pursuit of any kind, in spite of the assertion of the TO commander

that "all the institutions of the temporary government, such as the prosecutor's office and the court, were in operation," which was absurd anyway because no one even dared to look crossways at the members of the "liberation units." The desire to drive the bands out of Zvornik remained in the domain of wishes. "We have problems with several armed groups," newsmen were told at the time by Marko, "but we do not know to whom they belong. We have contacted Bogdanovic (Serbian minister of police at that time) and Seselj. They answered that they could not help, because those groups had gotten away from them. Today, for example, Azdaja and his people burst into the offices of the TO and threatened to kill us at gunpoint if we continued to insist that the paramilitary forces leave the city." The commander of the most numerous group, who always appeared accompanied by two glum TO soldiers, had an explanation as to why there was a conflict with members of the TO. "It seems that Mr. Marko sent the military police to disarm the volunteers. But because the volunteers are better fighters, they disarmed the police. We can expect all this to work out when the gentleman politicians finally realize that war is not waged in armchairs, but with a gun in your hand. I think that this new communist movement is behind these splits," the commander said. It can hardly be said that those "robber bands," as the police in Mali Zvornik refer to them, were waging war in eastern Bosnia. This was actually heedless murdering and looting.

On 10 May 1992, Muslim houses burned in Skelani and in the nearby villages Mihaljevici, Redzici, Lonjin, Krasanpolje, Rzine, Dzafici, Osamsko.... "I wanted to see it burn. The owner and his family had fled, because this restaurant was a meeting place of the Green Berets under command of Ahmet Tihic," said a TO member with glowing eyes who poured gasoline on Bekim Fehic's restaurant at the entrance to Skelani. A bulldozer then razed the torched Muslim houses. The explanation for the burnings, except for the desire we have mentioned, was rather unconvincing. Allegedly, the Muslims never returned to the burned-out ruins of their houses.

"Never before have there been so many vultures circling in the sky along the course of the Drina," observed local people in the Serbian villages on the right bank of the river. They stood and watched the torched Muslim houses burning on the other side of the river, accompanied by the sporadic fire of automatic rifles. It was clear to everyone that ethnic cleansing was taking place. "Evil will come from all this. One day the Muslims will return and take revenge," an old man expressed his suspicion out loud, while the others kept silent. No one was gladdened by the burning of the houses of those who had been neighbors until the day before.

The old man's prediction came true after a few months: The Muslims returned to some mixed and Serbian villages and took revenge in kind. They torched the Serbian houses and murdered the Serbian inhabitants. Even by that time there were hardly any volunteers from Serbia in eastern Bosnia. Most of them had fled to Serbia, carrying away the booty they had looted and their weapons.

### The Sanctions, and so Forth

The outcome of the trial of Dusan Vuckovic, the first Serb accused of war crimes, is uncertain, and at this point it is difficult to judge whether criminal prosecution of criminals will ensue on a larger scale. Especially because the international court for war crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia will not recognize the decisions of the national courts. As Antonio Cassese, presiding judge of the international court, said in the most recent May issue of the Italian magazine COOPERATIONE, "a number of effective measures to deter them from that kind of behavior has been envisaged against those countries which refuse to extradite suspected war criminals and thereby withhold cooperation from the court. One such measure might be imposing sanctions of the Security Council." Because we are already under sanctions, there seems nothing for us to do but to see what those "other measures" are.

## Serbia

### Minister Admits Nuclear Waste Stored in Mine

*AU1206171294 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 94 p 1*

[Report by M.B.L.: "Nuclear Waste Hidden in Kalna"]

[Text] Bor—Dr. Jovan Aleksic, minister of ecology in the Serbian Government, on Bor Lake yesterday announced a long-concealed truth that nuclear waste from the Vinca Institute was hidden in the tunnels of a long-abandoned uranium mine in Kalna near Knjazevac.

"We have followed the lead of a question raised by an assembly deputy and discovered that there really was nuclear waste deposited in barrels in the tunnels of the abandoned uranium mine in Kalna," Dr. Jovan Aleksic said to reporters at a news conference. His findings indicate that the waste originates from the Vinca Institute, however, a question remains whether it was the experts at this institute who did this or some other institution that did not know what to do with the radioactive waste.

In any case the waste will be returned to its true owner and residents in the vicinity of Kalna will again be able to graze their cattle on the nearby clearings. Dr. Aleksic was resolute in his conclusion that the problem of depositing nuclear, industrial, and any type of waste must be resolved expertly and with considerably less harmful consequences for the human environment.

A question remains as to who will attest to the great damages suffered by residents of Kalna, Mezdrej, Gabrovica, and other nearby villages.

## Montenegro

### SRS Leaders 'Harshly Condemn' Lilic Statement

*AU1006171394 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 94 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "The Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro—'Real Leaders of the Serbian People Think Differently'"]

[Text] "We harshly condemn the unmeasured statement by FRY President Lilic. It is clear to everybody who has read the text that the leader mentioned there must be in the Srpska republic as it is at war," it is said in the statement by the Serbian Radical Party of Montenegro.

"Is it possible that the Yugoslav president does not know the reasons for the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the reasons for not ending the war and for not establishing peace? He clumsily expressed his annoyance, as well as the annoyance of millions of Yugoslavs, with the fact that the civil war in Bosnia, because of which people are still being killed and suffering, is still going on.

"When it is known what the world wants from the Serbs in general and particularly from those in the Srpska republic, it is particularly inappropriate that the head of the Yugoslav federation directly accuses heroic Serbian leaders, saying that the war continues due their leadership ambitions. An insult to them is also an insult to the suffering and decimated people of the Srpska republic.

"Serbian leaders can immediately decide to end the war, albeit to do so means accepting the blackmail and giving Bosnia-Herzegovina over to Alija Izetbegovic. The sanctions on Yugoslavia would then be lifted, but the Serbian people would also end the centuries-old dream of a joint state, which has already been created. However, the Serbian people would also be left without respect and dignity, and the future generations of Serbs would be ashamed of our generation for deciding on a road of humiliation out of selfishness. We hope that this was only a momentary weakness of Mr. Lilic's and that the real leaders of the Serbian people think differently," the Montenegrin Radicals point out.